Research on the Paradigm Transformation and Advancement of China's Participation in Global Human Rights Governance

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Abstract: *Human rights constitute an important hallmark of the progress of human civilization, while global human rights governance forms a core component of global governance. For a long time, the international human rights agenda has been profoundly influenced by the Western liberal paradigm of human rights in terms of aspects such as conceptual interpretation, rule formation, and institutional operation. The politicization, instrumentalization, and application of double standards in human rights have undermined the fairness, representativeness, and effectiveness of global human rights governance. As the largest developing country, a founding member of the United Nations, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is duty-bound to serve as a mainstay in global human rights governance. The paradigm through which China participates in global human rights governance is both an external expression of its governance connotations and a channel for realizing governance outcomes. Since the restoration of its lawful seat at the United Nations in 1971, the People's Republic of China has progressively established a fundamental paradigm for its participation in global human rights governance. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), this paradigm has undergone a transformation and upgrading in terms of concepts, discourse, and practice. Meanwhile, China's participation continues to face structural challenges, including limited international explanatory power of its theoretical discourse, insufficient effectiveness of cross-cultural communication, inadequate capacity for rule shaping, and insufficient participation of social entities. China should, from the perspective of building a "community with a shared future for mankind" and with forward-looking thinking oriented toward the era of digital intelligence, promote the further transformation and upgrading of its participation paradigm by strengthening an independent knowledge system, enhancing the international translation of Chinese discourse, improving the operation of multilateral mechanisms, reinforcing the rule of law in foreign-related affairs, promoting coordinated participation among diverse social entities, and empowering governance through digital technologies, thereby contributing Chinese wisdom to steering global human rights governance toward a more equitable, just, reasonable, and inclusive direction.*

Keywords: the new era ♦ human rights ♦ global human rights governance ♦ paradigm transformation ♦ a community with a shared future for mankind

Introduction

For any major country or global power, its influence and leadership over the world are by no means solely dependent on the "direct rule" of hard power; the values and ideas it advocates and espouses constitute an indispensable banner of soft power that provides a guiding force at the spiritual level of humanity. Since the end of World War II, the international community has reached a distinct consensus on human rights, which constitutes the underlying logic of peace and development in human society, and is realized through the mainstreaming of human rights in the United Nations and the development of international rule of law. However, the universal development of international human rights norms has not automatically given rise to an equitable and reasonable global human rights governance order. For a long time, Western liberal human rights theories have held a dominant position in international human rights knowledge production, agenda-setting, and rule interpretation. Some Western countries have abstracted their institutional models formed under specific historical conditions into what they regard as the sole standards for

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human rights, and combined human rights issues with geopolitical strategies, ideological competition, and economic sanctions, resulting in problems such as politicization, selectivity, and double standards in the practice of international human rights mechanisms. The structural imbalance resulting therefrom not only compresses the space for developing countries to express their own human rights concepts and development demands, but also weakens the representativeness, inclusiveness, and effectiveness of global human rights governance. As the world's largest developing country, a founding member of the United Nations, and a permanent member of the Security Council, China shoulders both the domestic responsibility of continuously raising the level of human rights protection for its own people and the international responsibility of promoting the healthy development of the international cause of human rights. After the restoration of its lawful seat in the United Nations, the People's Republic of China gradually participated in UN human rights mechanisms; since the reform and opening-up, China has continuously expanded its international human rights cooperation by acceding to international human rights conventions, submitting compliance reports, participating in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and conducting bilateral and multilateral human rights dialogues. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, China has explicitly proposed unswervingly following China's path of human rights development, proactively participating in global human rights governance, promoting the comprehensive development of the cause of human rights, and gradually transforming from a participant and recipient of international human rights rules into a contributor of ideas, a provider of public goods, and a shaper of the human rights agenda.

I. Initial Paradigm and Basic Characteristics of China's Participation in Global Human Rights Governance

China's participation in global human rights governance is not an isolated policy choice, but the result of the combined effects of the development of international human rights law, the progress of China's cause of human rights, and the evolution of the global governance landscape. Its conceptual boundaries, theoretical foundations, and practical forms should be examined within the historical process of the international human rights normative system and the development of the PRC's foreign relations.

A. Jurisprudential basis and conceptual boundaries of global human rights governance

Although the concept of global human rights governance was proposed relatively late, its process began as early as the establishment of the United Nations. In the traditional international law system, human rights protection was primarily regarded as a matter of domestic jurisdiction; after World War II, human rights evolved from domestic values and institutional arrangements into a normative issue of common concern to the international community. The *Charter of the United Nations* has established the principle of human rights, designating the promotion of and respect for human rights as one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations; the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* has established human rights standards; and the international human rights treaty system, represented by the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* and the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, has continuously enriched the content of human rights. All the aforementioned constitute the jurisprudential basis and normative guarantee for global human rights governance.

Global human rights governance is global governance in the field of human rights, referring to the multilateral systems and processes involving the joint participation of the international community aiming to promote and protect human rights. It primarily refers to the institutionalized interaction process formed by states, international organizations, and other actors around human rights concept interpretation, international rule-making, compliance monitoring, policy coordination, capacity building, dispute response, and public goods provision. Its core elements include the diversity of governance actors, the normativity of governance rules, the multi-layered nature of governance mechanisms, and the public nature of governance objectives. State participation in global human rights governance encompasses participating in the United Nations Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, and the Universal Periodic Review, as well as conducting international human rights dialogues, providing development assistance and technical cooperation, participating

in the rule-making of emerging rights, and fulfilling international obligations through the development of domestic rule of law.

Global human rights governance is neither a form of world domination superseding state sovereignty nor "human rights diplomacy" in the Western context. In the 1970s, the Carter administration of the United States elevated human rights to a core pillar of its foreign policy, and since then, the term "human rights diplomacy" has been widely used to describe a state's foreign policy on human rights issues. However, it is fundamentally different from global human rights governance: On the one hand, this concept focuses on state actions and policy instruments, and thus falls short of fully encompassing the rule-making and implementation processes of human rights involving the joint participation of actors such as international organizations, treaty bodies, special procedures, social organizations, multinational corporations, and epistemic communities; on the other hand, in practice, it has been alienated by Western countries led by the United States into a means to exert diplomatic pressure, deliver conditional economic assistance, and conduct strategic competition, manipulating and interfering with global human rights governance.

B. Principle standpoints and basic paradigms of the PRC's participation in global human rights governance

"China's participation in global human rights governance" refers to the institutional practice in which China, based on its own path of human rights development and practices of human rights protection, in accordance with the *Charter of the United Nations* and the principles of international human rights law, promotes the development of the international cause of human rights through conceptual initiatives, rule construction, mechanism operation, international cooperation, public goods provision, and international communication. Its purpose is not to replicate the policy model of Western countries where human rights issues are used to serve power politics, but to promote the democratization, rule of law, fairness, and inclusiveness of global human rights governance.

The existing paradigm of China's participation in global human rights governance can be examined from three dimensions: theory, discourse, and practice. Theory serves as the foundation, discourse as the means, and practice as implementation. Among them, the theoretical dimension constitutes the value foundation and normative basis, the discourse dimension undertakes conceptual interpretation and international communication, and the practical dimension is manifested as the specific ways in which China participates in international human rights mechanisms and carries out international human rights cooperation. Mutually reinforcing, these three dimensions jointly form the basic structure of China's participation in global human rights governance.

The restoration of its lawful seat in the United Nations in 1971 marked an important starting point for the PRC's institutionalized participation in United Nations human rights affairs. During this period, the basic principles guiding China's participation in international human rights affairs were sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and self-determination of peoples; its basic standpoints were opposition to colonialism, racism, hegemony, and power politics, safeguard of state sovereignty and the right to national self-determination, and support for Asian, African, and Latin American countries in striving for national independence and development rights. These principles and standpoints bear distinct historical imprints and characteristics of the times.

After the end of the Cold War, human rights increasingly became an important issue through which Western countries exerted pressure on China. Particularly after 1989, facing the consecutive anti-China proposals put forward by the West in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), China gradually shifted from limited participation in global human rights affairs to rule-based response, and from mere proclamation of standpoints to the simultaneous pursuit of dialogue, cooperation, and necessary struggle. On the one hand, in accordance with the principles of international law, China opposed the politicization of human rights and double standards; on the other hand, it actively acceded to international human rights conventions, participated in international human rights mechanisms, and conducted bilateral human rights dialogues, initially forming a participation paradigm characterized by sovereign equality as the baseline, the rights to subsistence and development as the focus, dialogue and cooperation as the method, and domestic

human rights progress as the foundation.

1. Theoretical core: establishing the baseline of sovereignty and the primary status of the rights to subsistence and development

Facing the West's offensives in the jurisprudential arena using the principle of "human rights above sovereignty," China first established a rigorous defense system on an ontological level, firmly arguing that sovereignty is the fundamental guarantee for human rights. On this basis, in accordance with Marx's historical materialistic assertion that "the first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals,"[1] the *Human Rights in China* white paper released in 1991 established for the first time the right to subsistence as the primary human right. This theoretical construction successfully broke through the West's narrow definition confining human rights to "civil and political rights" alone, and guided the focus of human rights issues toward balanced economic and social development, thereby winning considerable jurisprudential space and moral resonance for developing countries facing poverty and survival pressures.

2. Discourse construction: formulating the "Dialogue Approach", "National Conditions Approach", and "Comprehensive Outlook on Human Rights"

China has launched a set of combined measures against the Western discourse monopoly. Facing the anti-China proposals frequently tabled by the West at the United Nations, China first advocated the "Dialogue Approach," upholding the principle that human rights differences should be resolved through dialogue of equality and mutual respect, and resolutely opposing politicization and double standards. This discourse strategy, characterized by "dialogue rather than confrontation," has successfully redirected human rights issues back from the "judgment seat" set by the West to the "negotiating table" under the multilateral framework. Second, China constructed the "National Conditions Approach," emphasizing that the universality of human rights must be considered in light of the historical traditions, cultural backgrounds, and development levels of each country. This approach points out that while human rights values are universal, human rights concepts, systems, standards, institutions, and models are relative, thereby deconstructing the "uniqueness" and "universalism" of the Western human rights model from an epistemological perspective. Finally, China proposed the "Comprehensive Outlook on Human Rights." Countering the Western tendency toward "atomization" that overemphasizes individual political freedom, China advocates the unity of rights and obligations, the coordination of individual human rights and collective human rights, and the mutual promotion of civil and political rights alongside economic, social, and cultural rights. It emphasizes that all categories of human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated, and should be promoted and guaranteed in a coordinated manner according to specific national conditions and realistic conditions. This more inclusive discourse framework is more sound in academic theory and is also more aligned with the realistic needs of developing countries in practice.

3. Practical pathways: adhering to the guidance of the rule of law, coordinating domestic and external efforts, and pursuing both multilateral and bilateral approaches

At the level of international rule of law, China proactively embraces international rules, successively signing and ratifying a series of core human rights conventions, including the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*,[2] and incorporated "the state shall respect and protect human rights" into the *Constitution* in 2004, transforming external contestation into internal rule-of-law momentum. In terms of multilateral operations, China has strengthened South-South cooperation with the Group of 77 (G-77) and has successfully utilized procedural motions on multiple occasions on the UN multilateral stage to defeat anti-China proposals. At the bilateral level, China has established human rights dialogue mechanisms with more than 20 countries and organizations including the United States and the European Union, effectively

[1] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The German Ideology (Excerpt) (Autumn 1845-May 1846)," in *Marx & Engels Selected Works*, vol. 1 (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2012), 158.

[2] By June 2026, China had acceded to or ratified 29 international human rights instruments, including six core United Nations human rights conventions. See the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "Building a More Just and Reasonable Global Governance System: China's Philosophy, Initiatives and Actions," accessed July 23, 2026, https: //www. gov. cn/zhengce/202606/content_7072454. htm.

dividing the Western pressure coalition through constructive consultations and avoiding the impact of the excessive politicization of human rights issues on the overall situation of bilateral relations.

C. Paradigm differences between China's participation in global human rights governance and the West's external human rights policies

The "human rights diplomacy" of Western countries constitutes the complex landscape of contemporary international human rights politics, and has also set the backdrop for and posed challenges to China's participation in global human rights governance.

1. Typical paradigms of Western countries' external human rights policies

The United States' "human rights diplomacy" presents a "weaponized" paradigm of hegemonic intervention, which has a theoretical cornerstone established upon the abstract human nature theory of "natural rights." It has thereby constructed a hegemonic discourse system of "human rights without borders" and "human rights above sovereignty." In terms of practical pathways, relying on the country's comprehensive strength as a superpower, the U.S. "weaponizes" human rights issues and pursues a policy of "carrots and sticks" along with double standards. Externally, it frequently employs unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction, while domestically, it remains tight-lipped about its entrenched human rights ills such as racial discrimination and gun violence. This paradigm is essentially the practice of hegemony under the guise of human rights, making it the greatest source of chaos for the current politicization of international human rights mechanisms.

The European Union's "human rights diplomacy" presents an "institutionalized" paradigm, characterized by normative penetration. This paradigm has spilled over with the process of European integration. The EU tends to portray itself as a "normative power" distinct from traditional military powers.[3] In terms of discourse construction, it universalizes issues with specific European historical backgrounds such as labor rights and the abolition of the death penalty. In practice, it tends to combine "soft law" with "hard law," exerting soft pressure through extensive human rights dialogue mechanisms (such as the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue) while frequently and forcibly embedding human rights clauses into bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements (such as the *Cotonou Agreement*) to implement institutional binding. This paradigm exhibits strong covertness and a disciplinary nature.

Japan's "human rights diplomacy" presents a "pragmatic" paradigm of dependent followership, lacking original philosophical foundations and long remaining caught in the pinch between following U.S. strategy and safeguarding its own Asian geopolitical interests. Theoretically, on the one hand, it propagates Western "universal values," while on the other hand, it has to compromise with Asia's special circumstances, exhibiting dependency and vacillation. At the implementation level, Japan rarely adopts fierce confrontation or sanctions, but primarily uses official development assistance (ODA) as its core lever, employing soft-pressure tactics with economic interests as the "bait."

In summary, the three paradigms of the U.S., the EU, and Japan, though each has its own distinctive features, share a similar nature. Their common limitation lies in absolutizing Western experience from specific historical stages while ignoring the diversity of civilizations and developing countries' demands for the right to development. This structural hegemonic barrier is precisely the external resistance that China must face squarely and dismantle in its participation in global human rights governance in the new era.

2. Differences among participation paradigms and their generative roots

The paradigm of China's participation in global human rights governance formed in the early stage is essentially different from the three typical Western paradigms (see Table 1). This profound divergence is not merely a matter of frictions over specific issues, but rather an externalized manifestation of differences in deep-seated institutional logic and civilizational genes.

Table 1 Comparison of paradigms between China's participation in global human rights

[3] Based on Ian Manners' positioning of "Normative Power Europe," proposed in 2002. See Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2 (2002): 235-258.

governance and U.S., EU, and Japanese external human rights policies

Dimension of Paradigm Comparison	Country (Region)			
	China	U.S.	EU	Japan
Theoretical Core	Rights to subsistence and development as primary human rights	"Natural rights"	"Normative power"	Dependency theory
Discourse Construction	Dialogue Approach, National Conditions Approach, and Comprehensive Outlook on Human Rights	"Human rights above sovereignty" and supremacy of political rights	Labor rights and abolition of death penalty	"Human security"
Practical Pathways	Multilateral defense, bilateral dialogue, and domestic rule of law	"Carrots and sticks" and double standards	Combination of soft and hard law and institutional binding	Exertion of soft pressure by leveraging economic assistance
Paradigm Characteristics	Defensive and inclusive	Hegemonic and interventionist	Normative and penetrative	Dependent and followership-oriented

Source: Compiled by the author based on public data.

The roots of the divergence between Chinese and Western paradigms can be attributed to three dimensions: The first is the heterogeneity of historical and cultural backgrounds. The Western outlook on human rights is rooted in the individualist tradition of the natural law school, whereas China is deeply influenced by Marxist historical materialism, and the historical experience of national suffering in modern times, national independence, and social development has led China to place greater emphasis on the intrinsic connection among state sovereignty, national independence, social stability, and the overall well-being of the people. The second is the dislocation of economic development stages. The West has already transcended the stage of material scarcity, and thus regards ballots and political freedom as measurement criteria; while China, still in the development stage, necessarily regards poverty alleviation and guaranteeing the subsistence and development of over one billion people as the most urgent human rights demand. The third is the opposition of political systems and ideologies. The West regards "human rights diplomacy" as a tool to export the liberal democratic system and implement peaceful evolution, whereas China adheres to the socialist path and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, representing the interests of developing countries.

Although China's existing participation paradigm has successfully safeguarded its core national interests, it is inevitably marked by the "limitations of the times." In terms of theoretical supply, China largely remains in a defensive position responding to Western critiques. Despite its proposal of the rights to subsistence and development, China has yet to put forward, from the perspective of global governance, new rules for human rights governance that transcend Western liberalism and possess universally applicable guiding force. In terms of human rights narrative, there exists an obvious "discourse deficit." In terms of practical pathways, China relies too heavily on official diplomacy at the state level, and the participation of social forces (such as NGOs and think tanks) is severely insufficient. This intense collision between the limitations of the times and realistic demands constitutes the internal driving force for the comprehensive and systematic transformation of China's paradigm for participating in global human rights governance in the new

era.

II. Paradigm Transformation of China's Participation in Global Human Rights Governance in the New Era

Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, accompanied by tremendous achievements in the economy, science, and technology, as well as a substantial rise in the people's living standards, China has successfully forged a path of human rights development suited to its national conditions. Meanwhile, the Western hegemonic discourse on human rights is encountering dilemmas, and the global governance system is facing reform pressures, thus opening up strategic space for China. Consequently, China has initiated a paradigm transformation in its participation in global human rights governance. The core of this transformation lies in attempting to end the Western monopoly over the interpretation of "human rights," transitioning and upgrading from the "defensive and inclusive" paradigm formed after the reform and opening-up to a "leading" paradigm of the new era (see Figure 1), which "embodies the dual logic and significance of developing both domestic and international human rights undertakings."[4]




Figure 1: Paradigm transformation of China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era

A. Theoretical deepening

General Secretary Xi Jinping's important discourses on respecting and protecting human rights are a product of combining the Marxist Outlook on Human Rights with China's specific realities and with fine traditional Chinese culture under new historical conditions. They systematically answer a series of major questions such as why human rights should be developed, what kind of human rights should be developed, and how to develop human rights,[5] marking a new height in the Party's understanding of the laws governing the development of the cause of human rights, and providing scientific thought and theoretical support for the development of the cause of human rights in the new era.

1. Elucidating primary basic human rights: connecting the past with the present, and engaging in mutual learning with other civilizations

The very definition of human rights is the core question that determines the fundamentals of China's human rights path. It is centrally embodied in two core concepts put forward by Xi Jinping,

[4] Mao Junxiang and Yin Chen, "Modern Transformation and Paradigmatic Transcendence of China's Path of Human Rights Development," *Journal of Beijing Administration Institute* 6 (2025): 35.

[5] Huang Wenyi, "Major Theoretical Innovations in Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law: A Five-Year Retrospective," *Journal of People's Public Security University of China (Social Sciences Edition)* 6 (2025): 1-12.

general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee: First, "the rights to subsistence and development are primary basic human rights"[6]; second, "human rights have historical, specific and practical contexts. With different national conditions, histories, cultures, social systems and levels of economic and social development, countries should and can only explore suitable paths of human rights development in light of national realities and people's needs."[7] The former defines the hierarchical ordering of rights, while the latter anchors the path to the realization of human rights. Viewed from the dimension of sustaining traditional civilization, the people-oriented thought of "the people are the foundation of a state, and when the foundation is solid, the state is tranquil," the ideal of Great Harmony (*Datong*) that "the world belongs to the public," and the worldly wisdom of "harmony in diversity" in fine traditional Chinese culture provide a profound historical and cultural foundation for China's participation in global human rights governance, echoing across time and space with the principle of "putting people first" in contemporary Chinese human rights concepts. Analyzed from the dimension of staying true to the fundamental principles of the theoretical core, the Marxist Outlook on Human Rights reveals the class attribute and social attribute of human rights with historical materialistic methodology, and its ultimate pursuit of "the free and all-round development of human beings" anchors the value orientation for China's participation in global human rights governance, constituting the theoretical basis of core propositions.[8] Examined from the innovative dimension of mutual learning between China and the rest of the world, China's participation in global human rights governance has not fallen into the discourse trap of "Western-centrism"; instead, on the basis of respecting the principles of the *Charter of the United Nations*, it closely integrates them with the objective laws of human development, especially the national conditions and needs of developing countries, and constructs a comprehensive human rights outlook covering fields such as economy, politics, society, culture, and environment, providing a Chinese perspective for the international community to understand the interdependent relationships and coordinated development among all categories of human rights.

2. Anchoring global value consensus: a "community with a shared future for mankind"

The "community with a shared future for mankind" is the top-level concept contributed by China to global human rights governance. It expands the horizon of human rights from individuals and states to the entirety of "mankind," breaking the shackles of the "clash of civilizations" theory and demonstrating a profound concern for the common future of all humanity.[9] This concept provides important value coordinates for solving global human rights dilemmas, possessing three major functional roles for the development of the cause of human rights: At the level of cognitive guidance, it emphasizes the wholeness and diversity of human rights; at the level of value evaluation, it takes the common values of all humanity as the yardstick; at the level of action guidance, it emphasizes that the common interests of all humanity surpass local interests, requiring countries to replace confrontation with cooperation and jointly address global challenges in peace, development, security, and other fields.[10] Its theoretical connotation not only conforms to the

[6] "Xi Jinping's Congratulatory Letter Sent to an International Symposium on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Adoption of the United Nations' "Declaration on the Right to Development," website of the China Foundation for Human Rights Development, accessed May 25, 2026, http: //renquanjjh. com/2016/12/06/8e0bd6977ed04da09889b5beebe9f18f. html.

[7] "Xi Jinping Emphasizes Steadfastly Following China's Path of Human Rights Development to Promote Further Progress in Human Rights at the 37th Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee," CNR website, accessed May 25, 2026, https: //m. cnr. cn/news/20220227/t20220227_525751848. html.

[8] Wang Liwan and Di Lei, "Upholding Fundamental Principles and Making Innovations in Building China's Independent Human Rights Knowledge System: A Theoretical Review of Human Rights Research in 2024 and Outlook," *Human Rights* 2 (2025): 181-212.

[9] "With the Future of Humanity in Mind and the Well-Being of the People at Heart: Deeply Understanding and Grasping the Humanistic Appeal of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy," website for studies on Marxism, accessed June 16, 2026, http: //marxism. cass. cn/tsshzy/202510/t20251030_5922070. shtml.

[10] He Zhipeng, "Enlightenment of the Concept of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind for Global

purposes and principles of the *Charter of the United Nations*, but also highlights the vision of universal concern of Chinese civilization to "foster harmony among all nations," linking China's development practice with the common ideals of humanity, thereby redirecting international human rights discussions from the contest of models to the sharing of outcomes, and from value dissemination to value exchange and mutual learning among civilizations.

3. China's solution for human rights governance: The Four Global Initiatives

The Four Global Initiatives put forward by President Xi Jinping between 2021 and 2025 have achieved deep jurisprudential synergy with human rights issues, jointly constituting the strategic guidance for building a "community with a shared future for mankind." From four interconnected dimensions — development, security, civilization, and governance — they provide conceptual resources, cooperation principles, and action directions with a Chinese stance for global human rights governance, offering systematic jurisprudential support to dismantle the fragmentation and instrumentalization of Western human rights narratives, and realizing a theoretical leap from value proclamation to rule construction. Among them, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) highlights "promoting human rights through development,"[11] transcending the Western concept of "development based on human rights," placing the right to development at the core of global human rights governance, and responding to the urgent demands of developing countries for eradicating poverty, improving people's livelihoods, and enhancing development capacity. The Global Security Initiative (GSI) emphasizes a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, revealing the intrinsic relationship between peace, security, and human rights protection. The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) opposes civilization superiority and the homogenization of human rights models, advocating civilization equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness, providing value support for countries with different backgrounds to independently choose their paths of human rights development. The Global Governance Initiative (GGI), aimed at addressing international institutional injustice, rule imbalance, and governance deficits, advocates enhancing the representativeness and voice of developing countries in global governance, thereby promoting the transition of international human rights governance from domination by a few countries to joint participation by all nations.

The proposal of the Four Global Initiatives demonstrates that China not only advocates that the international community should respect China's path of human rights development, but also begins to provide concepts for human rights governance and institutional public goods centering on global common issues.

B. Discourse innovation

Both the externalization of theoretical innovation and the creation of a favorable public opinion environment for practice necessitate discursive expression. Facing problems such as the politicization of human rights and double standards that have long existed in the field of international human rights, China has adopted proactive measures in value defense and discourse reshaping. The core characteristic of its discourse transformation is shifting from the passive state long dominated by the Western discourse system to independent discourse construction based on Chinese practices, integrated with global perspectives, and oriented toward the future.

1. New interpretation of core concepts: the meta-narrative discourse of the "correct view of human rights"

The "Correct Outlook on Human Rights" is an original concept in Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law and a concentrated manifestation of his view on human rights; the six major

Human Rights Governance," *Human Rights* 6 (2025): 6-31.

[11] The resolution on "The Contribution of Development to the Enjoyment of All Human Rights," proposed by China on behalf of Global South countries at the 59th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, was adopted by consensus. See "Promoting Human Rights Through Development Becomes an International Consensus," website of the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, accessed May 16, 2026, https: //geneva. china-mission. gov. cn/dbtxwx/202507/t20250717_11671986. htm.

characteristics of China's human rights development profoundly expounded therein[12] showcase the contemporary Chinese outlook on human rights,[13] namely the Correct Outlook on Human Rights. It is condensed into the hallmark concept[14] that "the greatest human right of all is the right to a happy life."[15] This expression constitutes the meta-narrative discourse of China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era. It represents the concrete embodiment of the principle that "the rights to subsistence and development are the primary and basic human rights,"[16] and upholds and further develops it, thereby successfully anchoring human rights issues from abstract moral debates to quantifiable and comparable development dimensions such as economic growth, livelihood improvement, and infrastructure enhancement. Therefore, it has opened up a new track in the global human rights discourse arena, providing a powerful theoretical weapon and narrative template for developing countries to strive for discourse power.

2. Transformation of narrative frameworks: a multidimensional "people-centered" human rights narrative

China's international narrative of human rights in the new era has achieved a profound transformation from passive defense against external accusations to proactive narration of endogenous stories, with the establishment of a multidimensional narrative framework "centered on the people." It no longer goes around in circles around individual issues set by the West, but panoramically demonstrates the organic unity of human rights protection and China's overall social development process. For example, it illustrates the practice of poverty alleviation as the greatest human rights project through the story of "targeted poverty alleviation"; it expounds the breadth, authenticity, and effectiveness of political rights through "whole-process people's democracy"; it connects environmental protection with people's well-being through the concept that "lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets." Through these narrative frameworks, grand national development achievements are translated into concrete data on the improvement of life quality and the realization of rights for hundreds of millions of ordinary people.[17]

3. Upgrading discourse strategies: the tripartite tool of "fact-jurisprudence-morality"

In terms of strategies for discursive clashes and human rights communication, China has achieved an upgrade from passive defense to proactive agenda-setting, creating a composite discourse toolbox characterized by "facts as the basis, jurisprudence as the rationale, and morality as the banner." At the factual level, it systematically utilizes white papers, data, images, and on-site visits to construct a solid factual defense line, using development achievements themselves as the most powerful discourse; at the jurisprudential level, it more skillfully utilizes the principles of the *Charter of the United Nations* and relevant clauses in international human rights instruments (such as the right to development and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs) to ground its stance within the framework of international law, enhancing the jurisprudential authority of its discourse; at the moral level, it continues to hold high the common aspirations of the Global South, emphasizing win-win cooperation and opposing double standards, seizing the moral high ground. This multidimensional discourse strategy enables China to navigate complex international public

[12] "Consistently Upholding Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Coordinately Advancing the Dialectical Unity of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, and Political Rights, as well as Collective and Individual Human Rights, Keeping Abreast of the Times, and Pursuing Continuous Development Through Independence and Inclusive Mutual Learning," iTaiwannews website, https: //www. itaiwannews. cn/2017-08-18/566c316f-17a3-604c-361c-e506d54alf5b. html.

[13] Wang Xigen, "Promoting the Correct Outlook on Human Rights," government website of the National Forestry and Grassland Administration, accessed May 9, 2026, https: //www. forestry. gov. cn/c/www/xxyd/22919. jhtml.

[14] Yan Jun, "Scientific Connotation of Xi Jinping's Important Expositions on People's Happiness," *Inner Mongolia Social Sciences* 4 (2024): 1-8 and 213.

[15] Hu Yuhong, "Theoretical Guidance on Promoting the Correct Outlook on Human Rights," *Political Science and Law* 12 (2025): 2-17.

[16] The State Council Information Office, *Human Rights in China*, website of the State Council Information Office, accessed July 6, 2026, http: //www. scio. gov. cn/zfbps/ndhf/1991n/202207/t20220704_130710. html.

[17] Lu Guangjin, "Upholding a People-Centered Approach to Protecting and Promoting Human Rights in the Course of Development," *China News Release (Practical Edition)* 9 (2022): 13-16.

opinion with greater confidence and composure, not only defending but also initiating agendas and guiding the direction of discussions.

C. Practical expansion

China's practical transformation of participation in global human rights governance in the new era is characterized by the transition from limited participation with a primary focus on defense and counterattack in the past to all-out offense and active leadership. Through full-spectrum participation with simultaneous progress at the global, regional, bilateral, and unilateral levels, China proactively advocates its human rights concepts, vigorously constructs brand-new institutional rules, and effectively leads global human rights governance.

1. Comprehensive participation in the global arena: disseminating concepts and reconstructing rules

In the new era, China is active with a renewed posture in the global arena with the United Nations at its center, deeply participating in various activities of multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN human rights Special Procedures, and UN human rights treaty bodies. It elucidates China's human rights path in open, transparent, and constructive exchanges, and opposes selective accusations and confrontational reviews. For instance, China has participated in successive cycles of the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, where it has systematically explained that at present, China is comprehensively promoting the great cause of building a strong country and advancing national rejuvenation through Chinese modernization, adhering to the people-centered development philosophy, promoting high-quality development with new quality productive forces, and benefiting all the people with more achievements of modernization in a more equitable manner.[18]

More importantly, China has gradually transformed from a rule-taker to a rule-advocate and rule-shaper in multilateral mechanisms. China has been elected as a member of the UN Human Rights Council for the sixth time for the 2024-2026 term, and has promoted the inclusion of concepts such as "building a community with a shared future for mankind," "promoting human rights through development," and "promoting win-win cooperation in the field of human rights" into relevant resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, bringing broader attention to issues such as the legacy of colonialism, unilateral coercive measures, the right to development, and dialogue among civilizations.[19] In July 2025, the Human Rights Council adopted by consensus the resolution on "the contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights" proposed by China. This indicates that China is adjusting the value ranking of international human rights agendas through multilateral platforms, making development, cooperation, fairness, and diversity key keywords in global human rights discussions, and expanding the institutional visibility of relevant issues through resolution initiatives, joint statements, and international cooperation projects, among other measures.

China's social organizations, think tanks, and academic institutions have also gradually participated in UN human rights mechanisms, providing socialized and professional support for China's participation in global human rights governance by submitting written materials, hosting side events, and conducting international seminars. For example, the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS), the China Foundation for Human Rights Development, and the United Nations Association of China (UNA-China) have spoken out on issues such as the right to development, digital inclusion, barrier-free environments, freedom of religion and belief, cultural diversity, and protection of environmental rights, promoting complementarity between official diplomacy and people-to-people diplomacy.

2. Strengthening dialogue at the regional level: responding to differences and empowering cooperation

[18] "UN Human Rights Council Adopts Report on China's Participation in Fourth Cycle of Universal Periodic Review," China Human Rights Website, accessed January 12, 2026, https: //www. humanrights. cn/2024/07/052df78c24f eld4f9e806f290984dd2015. html.

[19] Luo Yanhua, "Main Characteristics of China's International Human Rights Cooperation and Exchanges from 2010 to 2020," *Human Rights* 6 (2022): 95-114.

Human rights dialogue at the regional level has the function of connecting the preceding and the following. On the one hand, it is an effective channel for responding to differences and managing disputes; on the other hand, it is an important platform for deepening cooperation and expanding consensus. The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue is a typical arena. The EU has long positioned itself as a "normative power" and has strong spillover impulses on human rights issues. China and the EU continuously conduct human rights dialogues, which not only help maintain communication channels, but also help point out the EU's double standards and its own dilemmas on an equal basis. Taking the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in June 2025 as an example, while elucidating the development achievements of China's cause of human rights, the Chinese side refuted the EU's groundless accusations and pointed out prominent problems existing in EU countries regarding democracy, freedom, economic, social, and cultural rights, refugee and migrant protection, racial discrimination, religious hatred, social stratification, judicial injustice, and police violence.[20]

In addition to the EU-China dialogue, based on its tremendous achievements in poverty reduction and development, China has systematically summarized its practice-proven experience in human rights protection and shared it with relevant countries through equal communication, capacity building, and development cooperation. For instance, China has joined the United Nations' Alliance for Poverty Eradication and shares poverty reduction experience with developing countries through platforms such as the China Poverty Reduction International Forum, the Africa-China High-Level Dialogue on Poverty Reduction and Development, and the ASEAN-China Forum on Social Development and Poverty Reduction[21]; by establishing the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund, it supports capacity building in developing countries and promotes the building of an equitable and reasonable international human rights governance system, having supported over 150 projects so far.[22] This pathway differs from the Western human rights export characterized by attached political conditions, effectively establishing China's image as a contributor and partner in the global cause of human rights.[23]

3. Expanding bilateral exchanges and consultations: deepening interaction and enhancing understanding

At the bilateral level, China has established regular human rights dialogue mechanisms with dozens of countries. For example, to date, China and Germany have held nearly 20 human rights dialogues, both offline and online; dialogues have increasingly shifted from conceptual clashes in the early stage to experience exchanges and project cooperation in pragmatic fields such as judicial reform, social security, and the protection of the rights of specific groups. In addition, China has actively carried out human rights consultations with developing countries and regions (such as Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa, Cuba, Russia, the African Union, Angola, Ethiopia, etc.). Before and after dialogues, organizers usually arrange visits and tours to enable participants to more directly understand each other's true situation. In 2024, media representatives from 16 countries visited the north and south of the Tianshan Mountains to experience the real Xinjiang.[24] Delegations of the China Society for Human Rights Studies have also visited foreign countries multiple times, including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil.

4. Fully leveraging home-ground diplomacy: proactive presentation and institutional shaping

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[20] "China and the EU Hold Human Rights Dialogue," website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed June 14, 2025, https: //www. fmprc. gov. cn/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/xos_673625/dqzz_673633/oumeng/xgxw_673641/202506/t20250614_11648676. shtml.

[21] "Global Significance of China's Path of Human Rights Development," People's Daily Online, accessed September 15, 2024, http: //theory. people. com. cn/nl/2024/0915/c40531-40321093. html.

[22] Wang Manqian, "Global Development Initiative Infuses New Momentum into Global Sustainable Development," *Red Flag Manuscript* 19 (2024): 48.

[23] Cui Xiaotao, "Promoting Human Rights Through Development: China's Pathway and Contribution to Improving Global Human Rights Governance," *French Studies*, online first January 4 (2026): 1-17.

[24] China Society for Human Rights Studies, *Annual Report on China's Human Rights (2025)*, December 2025.

By releasing white papers on human rights, *National Human Rights Action Plans*, and evaluation reports on their implementation, China introduces the development concepts, policy arrangements, and practical progress of China's cause of human rights to domestic and foreign audiences. From 2012 to 2025, China released 40 white papers on human rights, a frequency far exceeding that of the two decades between 1991 and 2011. These white papers are broad in scope, covering dozens of themes including comprehensive progress in human rights undertakings, poverty reduction, pandemic response, food security, peacekeeping operations, development in Xinjiang and Xizang, political party system, women's development, parasports, China's moderately prosperous society in all respects, green development, carbon neutrality and carbon peak, counter-terrorism, the Belt and Road Initiative, the community with a shared future for mankind, rule of law in cyberspace, China's democracy, Hong Kong under the policy of "One Country, Two Systems," and biodiversity.

China also actively leverages platforms such as international conferences, thematic forums, academic seminars, and policy dialogues to conduct home-ground diplomacy, forming a continuous and professional network for international human rights exchanges.[25] From 2017 to 2021, the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly hosted three sessions of the "South-South Human Rights Forum"; in 2023 and 2026, the State Council Information Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the China International Development Cooperation Agency hosted two sessions of the "Forum on Global Human Rights Governance"; institutions such as the China Society for Human Rights Studies have continuously hosted international exchange events such as the Beijing Forum on Human Rights and the China-Europe Seminar on Human Rights. The Beijing Forum on Human Rights held its 10th session in 2022; the China-Europe Seminar on Human Rights has been held continuously through 2026, and its topics have gradually extended from traditional rights protection to digital technology, international order, and global human rights governance. China is no longer merely a passive responder within the West-dominated agenda system. Instead, by setting its own topics, inviting multi-party participation, and fostering equal discussions, China is gradually building a platform for participation in global human rights governance that reflects its agenda awareness and has the attributes of an international public good.

III. Structural Tensions in the Paradigm Transformation of China's Participation in Global Human Rights Governance in the New Era

The paradigm transformation of China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era is not a one-way evolution achieved overnight, but a dynamic structural contestation unfolded through fierce clashes with the traditional Western human rights hegemony system. Out of strategic anxiety over maintaining their institutional hegemony and monopoly over rules, Western countries will inevitably mount a strong backlash and systematic suppression against China's rising agency and paradigm transformation in participating in global human rights governance. It is precisely under this high-pressure contestation that the deep-seated constraints on China's paradigm transformation in participating in global human rights governance gradually become exposed, manifested across three dimensions: theory, discourse, and practice.

A. Theoretical tension: the contradiction between enhanced theoretical originality and insufficient international explanatory power

Currently, the hegemonic expansion of Western "universal values" and the relative inadequacy of China's independent theoretical construction remain deep-seated constraints restricting China's participation in global human rights governance from leaping from a "defensive type" to a "leading type." Although China has accumulated rich human rights practices in areas such as poverty reduction, development, social security, whole-process people's democracy, and ecological civilization construction, and possesses a certain original intellectual foundation, how to create a theoretical system and conceptual expression capable of responding to global common concerns and possessing international translatability, so as to enhance the explanatory power of China's independent knowledge system for human rights and further form rules applicable to global human

[25] Xing Aifen and Yan Ge, "Research on the Home-Field Diplomacy Approach to International Communication of Chinese Rule of Law," *Henan Social Sciences* 2 (2026): 78-86.

rights governance, remains the primary theoretical challenge currently faced by China.

The task of theoretical construction is centrally embodied in three aspects: The first is to deepen the theoretical foundation, clarifying from the perspective of human rights ontology the contemporary value of the Marxist Outlook on Human Rights such as "real human beings," "human beings in development," and "human beings in social relations," so as to transcend the limitations of the Western abstract individualistic view of human rights; the second is to distill rule formation, condensing the international rule-of-law elements contained in China's global initiatives into principles of global governance, and translating policy initiatives into rule-of-law rule propositions; the third is to innovate discursive expression, transforming China's propositions such as "the greatest human right of all is the right to a happy life," "promoting human rights through development," and the "common values of all humanity" from the dimensions of fine traditional Chinese culture and global governance into normative expressions understandable and shareable by the international community. Only by completing this theoretical transformation can we truly further translate factual advantages and practical advantages into theoretical advantages and rule advantages.

B. Discursive tension: the contradiction between the formation of an autonomous narrative system and insufficient cross-cultural communication efficacy

An independent discourse system has initially taken shape in China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era, but this does not mean the natural realization of communication efficacy. The international public opinion arena has long been characterized by the pattern of "a strong West and a weak East." Western mainstream media, transnational communication platforms, international non-governmental organizations, and knowledge production institutions possess strong agenda-setting capacity on China-related human rights issues. Through selective reporting, framed explanations, and emotional labeling, they incorporate complex issues such as Xinjiang-related, Xizang-related, Hong Kong-related matters, labor rights and interests, and religious freedom into the ideological narrative of "democracy versus authoritarianism," exerting sustained pressure on the framing of China's human rights image. As a result, even though China has become the focus of global attention, it often remains in a state of aphasia where "reasons cannot be clearly explained, and explanations cannot be widely spread."[26]

Meanwhile, China is still continuously exploring the construction of its cross-cultural empathetic communication capacity, and the acceptance of Chinese-style human rights discourse in international academic and public opinion circles remains limited. Due to monotonous forms of expression, foreign-related discourse faces the challenge of limited effectiveness. In the past, China's human rights narratives tended to be overly macro-oriented, heavy in policy language, and overly reliant on the presentation of achievements and clarification of facts.

Therefore, the challenge at the discursive level is not that China has "nothing to say," but how to realize the transformation from "sufficient facts" to "effective expression," from "correct policies" to "emotional accessibility," and from "official narration" to "multi-actor resonance." It is necessary both to expose the double standards and political manipulation in Western human rights discourse and avoid falling into purely argumentative communication; both to adhere to the Chinese stance and improve cross-cultural expression capabilities; both to tell the story of national development achievements well and tell the story of ordinary people's rights realization well. In addition, it is necessary not only to publicize "what we have done," but also to fully explain "why we have done it," "how to bring the benefits of human rights progress to ordinary people," and "what enlightenment this experience can bring to other countries," so as to achieve stable international recognition.

C. Practical tension: the contradiction between enhanced multilateral participation capacity and insufficient professionalization, socialization, and institutionalization

At the practical level, China has entered a new stage of "confident leadership" in the multilateral human rights arena[27]; however, compared with the long-accumulated institutional

[26] Zhao Kejin, "Exploring China's Global Strategy in the New Era," *China International Studies* 5 (2021): 31.
[27] "Conclusion of the 61st Session of the UN Human Rights Council," accessed April 4, 2026, https: //mp. weixin.

resources, legal tools, and social organization networks of the West, China's participation in global human rights governance still faces major tensions characterized by insufficient professionalization, socialization, and institutionalization.

Foreign-related rule-of-law instruments still need further systematization. In recent years, certain Western countries, under the pretext of so-called human rights issues, have imposed illegal unilateral sanctions on Chinese institutions, enterprises, and individuals, and implemented long-arm jurisdiction through means such as the extraterritorial application of domestic laws, supply chain review, export controls, and financial restrictions. China has built a foundation for countermeasures through laws such as the *Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law* and the *Law on Foreign Relations*, but improvements are still needed in aspects such as the alignment of legal applications, corporate compliance support, cross-border litigation assistance, evidence collection, international arbitration, and public opinion coordination.

Agenda-shaping capacity in multilateral mechanisms also needs to be strengthened. China has already established a certain degree of influence on issues such as the right to development, win-win cooperation, opposition to unilateral coercive measures, and dialogue among civilizations. Nevertheless, how to continuously translate conceptual initiatives into international rule texts, institutional agendas, expert mechanisms, and evaluation standards still requires a higher level of professional operational management. Competition in international human rights mechanisms occurs not only in public debate arenas, but also in meticulous links such as document drafting, agenda arrangement, expert appointments, information adoption, and procedural rules.

The penetrative offensive of Western non-governmental organizations remains significantly stronger than the role and influence of Chinese social organizations on the international stage.[28] They have long participated deeply in United Nations human rights mechanisms, shaping agendas through submitting reports, organizing side events, influencing media, and lobbying delegations. In contrast, there is still significant room for improvement in the participation of Chinese social organizations, think tanks, universities, industry associations, and enterprises in international human rights communication, fact-finding, norm research, public debate, and cross-cultural communication. China urgently needs to build a comprehensive mechanism where official diplomacy, people-to-people diplomacy, academic diplomacy, media communication, and enterprise compliance can exert joint efforts.

IV. Advancement Pathways for the Paradigm Transformation of China's Participation in Global Human Rights Governance in the New Era

The year 2026 is the first year of China's 15th Five-Year Plan period. The *Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development*, adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, explicitly propose to "promote all-around advancement of human rights" as "progress has been secured on all fronts of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics"[29]; the *National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2026-2030)* will further list promoting and improving global human rights governance, conducting international human rights dialogues and cooperation, participating in United Nations human rights affairs, and advancing compliance reviews as dedicated tasks. Therefore, facing the profound adjustments in the international human rights governance landscape, the rise of Global South forces, the intensifying trend of politicizing human rights in the West, and the new situation where digital-intelligent technology is reshaping the forms of human rights, the advancement of the paradigm transformation of China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era should be rooted in

qq. com/s/NxoAauOG4Tnt3bBv-dxowg.

[28] Lin Junjie, "Consultative Status of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and Its Significance for China," *International Study Reference* 8 (2019): 10.

[29] "Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development," Huanqiu Website, accessed January 1, 2026, https: //china. huanqiu. com/article/40uWEchQ2yz.

China's path, respond to the questions of the times, and aim at prospective leadership.

A. Deepening theoretical foundations: enhancing the international explanatory power and normative shaping force of China's human rights theory

The capability for theoretical supply determines a country's deep-seated competitiveness in participating in global human rights governance. Currently, China needs not only to propose Chinese solutions to address global problems, but also to possess solid theoretical support and jurisprudential endorsement for such solutions.

1. Establishing an independent knowledge system of human rights in China to enhance the theoretical explanatory power of China's human rights practice

Establishing an independent knowledge system of human rights in China is the theoretical support for China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era, and furthermore an inevitable requirement for scientifically elucidating the internal jurisprudential logic of China's series of global initiatives. This endeavor cannot and should not copy or continue to use Western knowledge systems.[30] Instead, it must, on the basis of the Marxist Outlook on Human Rights, the Chinese socialist rule of law theory, fine traditional Chinese culture, and contemporary Chinese human rights practice, deepen China's theoretical foundation of human rights and strengthen its theoretical supply of human rights. This endeavor advances from "how human rights discourse should be expressed" to "how concrete human rights of individuals are truly realized in the process of Chinese modernization" and "how China's human rights path and experience possess significance and value for global human rights governance." Specifically:

The ontology of human rights should be reconstructed starting from "real human beings." "People-centeredness" is not only the core value upheld by China's cause of human rights, but also the fundamental orientation for participating in global human rights governance and building a new international order that is just and reasonable. The recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan list "adhering to the philosophy of putting people first" as one of the principles that economic and social development must follow, which should serve as the overarching guideline for conducting in-depth theoretical interpretation starting from the teleology, path theory, institutional theory, practical theory, and cooperation theory of human rights. Through the systematization of independent theories, China fully demonstrates to the international community that "adhering to the philosophy of putting people first" and "striving for practical results" advocated in the Global Governance Initiative are substantially the value spillover of China's domestic human rights protection philosophy in the field of multilateral governance.

The path of human rights development should be elucidated starting from Chinese modernization. Combining universal principles with China's realities,[31] it should be explained how the universal principles of human rights are manifested as a path of human rights development featuring characteristics of China's national conditions through the institutional practice and development process of Chinese modernization. Chinese modernization is not a modernization that is based on capital expansion or external plunder, but a modernization that adheres to the principal status of the people, common prosperity, material and cultural-ethical advancement, harmonious coexistence between human and nature, and peaceful development, providing new institutional scenarios and practical foundations for human rights protection. The human rights connotations of Chinese modernization should be extracted centering on practices such as poverty alleviation, rural revitalization, coordinated regional development, whole-process people's democracy, and the building of a peaceful, rule-of-law, healthy, and beautiful China, so as to illustrate that China's cause of human rights is not a copy of the Western model, but a manifestation of the diversity of modernization paths in the field of human rights.

Starting from the building of a "community with a shared future for mankind," we should expand the international resonance of human rights theory, as "mankind has become a close-knit

[30] Liu Zhiqiang, "On the Construction of China's Independent Knowledge System of Human Rights," *Science of Law (Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law)* 5 (2025): 66.

[31] Xi Jinping's speech at the 37th Group Study Session of the Political Bureau of the 19th Central Committee on February 25, 2022.

community of shared future."[32] The building of a "community with a shared future for mankind" proposed by China is not a simple political initiative, but a normative concept with profound international jurisprudential foundations. On the one hand, this concept emphasizes transcending the interests of individual states and focusing on the survival and development of all humanity, which highly aligns with concepts in international law such as "obligations *erga omnes*" and the "common interests of the international community," providing theoretical support for international law to move from "coexistence" to "cooperation" and "co-advancement"; on the other hand, this concept encompasses collective human rights dimensions such as the right to peace, the right to development, and environmental rights, highly consistent with the value goals of international legal documents such as the *Declaration on the Right to Development*, the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, and the *Paris Agreement*, helping to form an outlook on legal justice oriented toward development and featuring harmonious coexistence between human and nature. The gradual incorporation of this concept into international law promotes the deep transformation of international law from "being rule-oriented" to "attaching equal importance to values and rules," signaling that the value system of international law is stepping into a new stage of caring for the shared destiny of all humanity from national security centrism.

2. Reshaping rules of global human rights governance to enhance the jurisprudential efficacy of China's Four Global Initiatives

Under the vision of building a "community with a shared future for mankind," global governance and global human rights governance are highly overlapping and share the same underlying logic. The Four Global Initiatives put forward by China, especially the five core principles in the Global Governance Initiative (sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, people-centeredness, and action-orientation), are both upgraded expressions of China's consistent stance and propositions, and embody rich international law connotations. We should fully explore and distill the spirit of international rule of law embedded in the Four Global Initiatives, transforming and formulating them into operable global human rights governance principles and propositions, enabling them to match the historical contributions made to international relations and international law by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by China 70 years ago.

Whether at the critical juncture of reform in traditional fields, or in emerging fields of global governance such as the deep sea, polar regions, outer space, climate change, cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), and big data, we should seize the "window period" of rule-making to form and propose China's rule solutions. For instance, in the field of traditional economy and trade, the joint building of the Belt and Road Initiative led by China innovatively integrated the principle of the right to development into international economic and trade rules; in the ecological and environmental field, the intellectual wisdom of "harmony between humanity and nature" in traditional Chinese culture was creatively transformed into the modern interpretation of a "community of life for mankind and nature"; in the field of cyberspace security governance, China has taken the lead in systematically proposing the concept of "cyberspace sovereignty" and promoted the adoption of the *United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime*; targeting controversial concepts such as the "responsibility to protect," Chinese scholars have put forward the theoretical framework of "responsible protection," combining the principle of non-interference in internal affairs with modern human rights protection requirements; in terms of promoting the formulation of global digital governance conventions, the legislative experience of the *Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China* is worth distilling. In future global human rights governance, the principle of the "global majority" can also be innovatively cited; this not only conforms to the democratic spirit touted by Western developed countries, rendering it difficult for them to openly oppose it, but also incorporates the sovereign equality and the safeguarding of developing countries' interests that we have always upheld, thereby rectifying the current unjust situation in global governance where, at both the practical and institutional levels, discourse power

[32] Xi Jinping, *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017), 481.

is overly concentrated among a few developed countries and rule-making serves the interests of a few specific countries.

3. Proposing human rights concepts in the digital-intelligent era to enhance the normative supply capacity of China's human rights theory

Theoretical construction must be forward-looking. The digital-intelligent era puts forward new requirements for human rights theories, and traditional Western human rights theories exhibit obvious inadequacy when facing emerging issues such as algorithmic bias, data sovereignty, and the ethics of artificial intelligence. China should seize the important window period when global digital-intelligent rules are not yet fully finalized to construct human rights concepts of the digital-intelligent era from aspects such as jurisprudence, propositions, concepts, and rules.

First, the relationship between digital technology and the comprehensive development of human beings should be theoretically elucidated. The "free and all-round development of human beings" pursued by the Marxist Outlook on Human Rights has new conditions for realization in the digital-intelligent era. Digital technology can enhance the accessibility of education, medical care, employment, social security, and public services, and expand opportunities for the people to participate in economic and social life; however, if technology is monopolized by capital, algorithms are abused by power, and data is unequally appropriated, digitalization may also exacerbate human alienation and social inequality. Therefore, the core of the theory of digital-intelligent human rights should not be confined to personal data protection or privacy protection, but should incorporate the right to digital development, the right to digital equality, algorithmic justice, platform responsibility, smart technology accessibility, and digital capacity building into a holistic human rights framework.

Currently, the global digital divide is increasingly becoming a new form of development divide. Developed countries boast advantages in computing power, data, chips, models, platforms, and standards, while developing countries face structural inequalities in digital infrastructure, technological capacity, and rule participation. If this pattern remains unchanged, artificial intelligence may further widen the North-South divide, leaving the people of developing countries in a new disadvantageous position in education, medical care, employment, and public governance. The United Nations' *Global Digital Compact* emphasizes building an open, free, secure, and people-centered digital future, and regards international law and human rights protection as an important foundation for digital governance; UNESCO's *Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence* explicitly places human dignity and human rights at the center of artificial intelligence ethical governance. China has taken the lead in conducting systematic theoretical construction on "the right to development in the digital age," and combined with its own practices in digital governance and artificial intelligence development, actively advocates a digital-intelligent human rights concept that balances development, security, fairness, and dignity, safeguarding the development rights of developing countries in the digital-intelligent era. It should continue to actively promote the inclusion of the right to digital development, digital equality, algorithmic justice, and digital capacity building into discussions on global human rights governance, and ultimately forge important issues reflecting the common aspirations of Global South countries and possessing international consensus within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, constructing a principle system of digital-intelligent human rights featuring "people-centeredness, intelligence for good, fairness and inclusiveness, and security and controllability," thereby becoming an innovator and practical leader of human rights theory in the digital-intelligent era. The World Artificial Intelligence Conference hosted by China in Shanghai in July 2026 is also a guidance and promotion for the realization of human rights to development in the digital-intelligent era.

B. Optimizing discourse translation: enhancing the cross-cultural communication efficacy of China's human rights narrative

China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era has formed a relatively complete independent discourse system, but in international communication, it still needs to be strengthened in both substantive content and scientific techniques. First, it should shift from a

simple narrative of achievements to an expression of human rights realization, moving from "what we have done" to "how our practices constitute mechanisms for the realization of rights" (including how human rights enter constitutions and laws from political ideas, how they enter public policies from legal norms, and how they enter ordinary people's living conditions from public policies; how remedies are obtained after rights are infringed; how state capacity both guarantees rights and is constrained by rights, etc.). Second, it should resolve the issues of expression methods, audience differences, and emotional resonance.

1. Discourse construction: distilling internationally communicable hallmark concepts

In communicating China's human rights discourse internationally, we should neither simply transplant domestic political discourse, nor passively adopt the conceptual framework set by the West. Instead, on the basis of fusing Chinese and foreign elements as well as connecting the past and the present, we should distill hallmark concepts with international explanatory and communicative power, and carry out concept engineering by scientifically defining concepts, clarifying connotations, encompassing extensions, delineating boundaries, and designing evaluation criteria. Translatable human rights discourse should be extracted from fine traditional Chinese cultural resources. For instance, the concept that "the people are the foundation of a state, and when the foundation is solid, the state is tranquil" in Chinese civilization reflects a people-centered value orientation of state governance; the concept that "the world belongs to the public" reflects a public responsibility consciousness transcending narrow national self-interest; the philosophy of "harmony in diversity" reflects a civilization view of respecting differences and opposing forced assimilation; the aphorism that "do not do to others what you do not want others to do to you" reflects the ethical principle of equal interaction and opposition to double standards; the philosophy of "harmony between humanity and nature" reflects the ecological wisdom of harmonious coexistence between human and nature. We cannot simply regard these thoughts as a replacement for modern human rights concepts, but should leverage innovative development to transform them into expressions in contemporary international human rights discourse such as people's subjectivity, diversity of human rights paths, civilizational equality, global public responsibility, ecological human rights, and intergenerational justice.

Hallmark concepts grounded in reality should also be distilled from China's contemporary practice. "The greatest human right of all is the right to a happy life" — this expression can serve as the core expression of China's human rights discourse, emphasizing that the ultimate purpose of the cause of human rights lies in the enhancement of people's quality of life, sense of dignity, sense of gain, sense of security, and sense of happiness. The concept of "promoting human rights through development" can serve as a key concept for the Global South, illustrating that development is not an external condition of human rights, but an important pathway to the realization of human rights. "Whole-process people's democracy" can be used to elucidate the institutional logic of the protection of political rights in China, emphasizing that democracy is not only manifested in periodic elections, but is more reflected in the continuous participation of the people in democratic elections, consultations, decision-making, management, and oversight. "Common prosperity" can be used to explain social rights, fairness and justice, and substantive equality. The concept that "lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets" can be used to connect environmental rights, ecological civilization, and sustainable development.

The Four Global Initiatives take the common values of all humanity — "peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom" — as their underlying logic, people's well-being as their fundamental purpose, and "extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits" as their basic method, exhibiting internal consistency in concepts, goals, principles, and paths.[33] Therefore, it is particularly necessary to distill the contemporary advanced human rights concepts contained in the Four Global Initiatives, such as openness, inclusiveness, win-win cooperation, and shared values, and deeply integrate them into the human rights discourse system. For example, the concept of the

[33] Research Center on Building a Community with a Shared Future for Humanity, "Connotations, Practices, and Goals of the Four Global Initiatives," *Learning and Research* 1 (2026): 55-58.

"right to peaceful development" proposed by Chinese scholars aims to bridge the theoretical division between the right to peace and the right to development.[34]

2. Narrative strategies: multi-dimensional story systems and precise empathetic communication

It is necessary to enrich core narrative dimensions. In terms of development narrative, achievements such as China's poverty reduction, livelihood improvement, and leaps in infrastructure construction should be transformed into coherent stories and referable experience of "realizing human rights through development." In terms of process narrative, the phased nature, characteristics of national conditions, and evolutionary logic of reform of China's human rights development should be explained candidly, so as to win the understanding of the international community as a "progressing reformer" and thus defuse harsh criticisms under "perfectionist" presuppositions. In terms of global narrative, the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative and multilateral cooperation projects should be transformed into vivid practices of promoting the right to development of people in all countries and building a community with a shared future.

When participating in global human rights governance at the level of international communication, we should adopt narrative strategies of classified policy implementation and audience-specific communication in light of the differences among various countries and organizations in terms of human rights awareness, theory, and practice. For China-related human rights criticisms raised by relevant countries and organizations, responses and exchanges should be conducted in accordance with the law, grounded in facts, and on an equal basis. When necessary, we should courageously engage in discursive clashes and jurisprudential struggles, exposing their double standards and own dilemmas on human rights issues by publishing authoritative reports and factual comparisons, thereby breaking their narrative of moral superiority; for friendly countries and developing countries, emotional resonance and interest ties should be strengthened, and through public diplomacy, media cooperation, and cultural exchanges, "intersubjective recognition" should be deepened to build a shared narrative of "win-win cooperation," promoting communication to shift from "expanding coverage" to "enhancing recognition."

It is necessary to adopt a "resonant" narrative to innovate expressions. On the one hand, we should identify the basic consensus of Chinese and foreign human rights concerns, and select "empathy points" of universal significance in China's cause of human rights. For example, introducing the "Fengqiao experience" of resolving conflicts at the source enhances international audiences' conceptual recognition and emotional resonance with China's philosophy of treasuring harmonious interpersonal relations. On the other hand, we should be adept at using narrative methods close to audiences of different regional cultures, integrating grand concepts into specific characters, scenes, and details, realizing the transformation from low-context direct statements to high-context cultural empathy.

3. Digital-intelligent technology: enhancing the precision and credibility of international communication

Digital-intelligent technology is reshaping the international communication ecosystem. China's participation in global human rights governance should organically embed technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, virtual reality, blockchain, intelligent translation, and social platform analysis into the human rights communication system, so as to enhance the precision, interactivity, and credibility of communication.

Big data can be utilized to enhance audience research and issue identification capability. Through semantic analysis of international media, social platforms, think tank reports, NGO materials, and international organization documents, it is possible to identify the focus of attention, emotional structure, and cognitive bias across different regions and groups regarding China's human rights issues, thereby achieving precise communication through a "one country, one policy"

[34] "'Promoting Human Rights Through Development': Nearly 100 Scholars Gather to Discuss 'China Proposal' for Global Human Rights Governance," website of China News Service, accessed May 16, 2025, https: //vs. cns. com. cn/video/detail-Temp/606603. html?id=606603.

and "one group, one plan" approach.

Artificial intelligence can be utilized to enhance multilingual expression and content production capabilities. Human rights communication involves complex concepts, legal terminology, and cultural differences. Therefore, mechanical translation and stiff expressions must be avoided. Multilingual databases of human rights terminology, typical case libraries, and international communication corpora can be established, and artificial intelligence can be used to assist in generating communication products in different languages, styles, and lengths, which will then be reviewed and proofread by professionals to ensure accuracy and cultural adaptability.

Immersive technology can be utilized to enhance the communication experience. Virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), and digital exhibition halls can be used to present China's poverty alleviation, ecological governance, development in ethnic minority areas, efforts to improve accessibility and remove barriers, public health, and grassroots democracy practices, enabling international audiences to understand China's cause of human rights through visual, scenario-based, and interactive ways. Compared with one-way promotion, immersive communication is easier to form embodied experience and emotional identification.

Multi-actor digital communication should be promoted. Digital platforms have lowered the threshold for international communication. As a result, think tanks, universities, social organizations, media, enterprises, and ordinary citizens can all become subjects of human rights narratives. Social organizations and professional institutions should be encouraged to participate in human rights communication through forms such as international social platforms, thematic websites, podcasts, short videos, open courses, and online seminars, supplementing official expressions with non-governmental, professional, and life-oriented narratives, thereby forming a multi-level communication matrix.

Fact-checking and credible communication should be strengthened. In response to false information, fabricated evidence, and selective editing concerning human rights in China within the Western public opinion arena, exploration can be made to use blockchain attestation, open data platforms, verifiable video materials, and third-party cooperative research to enhance the evidentiary strength of China's human rights narrative. The level of transparency and mutual trust in international cooperation can be enhanced through data traceability mechanisms, especially in international humanitarian aid, cooperation on cross-border development, digital identity protection, and public project evaluation.

C. Refining practical support: enhancing capacity for institutional operation and digital-intelligent empowerment in global human rights governance

The paradigm transformation of China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era necessitates the construction of a multidimensional practical path at the operational level that integrates traditional culture, relies on foreign-related rule of law, and enables the skillful operation of multilateral mechanisms, thereby truly realizing a substantial transition from a "participant" to a "contributor" and then to a "leader."

1. Strengthening rule-of-law safeguards for foreign-related matters and enriching the legal toolkit for countermeasures and prevention

In the dimension of foreign-related rule of law, we should communicate the Chinese rule-of-law culture globally, characterized by the pursuit of "a world without litigation, where harmony is held in high esteem." We should also build a solid legal toolkit against interference and sanctions, so as to provide strong institutional shields and countermeasure tools for China's participation in global human rights governance. China has successively promulgated foreign-related laws such as the *Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China* and the *Law on Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, explicitly stipulating that China shall have the right to adopt corresponding countermeasures and restrictive measures against acts that violate international law and the basic norms of international relations and endanger national sovereignty, security, and development interests. In future diplomatic and legal operations, compliance and countermeasure mechanisms should be further refined to impose precise countermeasures in accordance with the law against foreign entities and individuals interfering in China's internal affairs and infringing

upon the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and institutions. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises and social organizations should be actively encouraged and supported to utilize domestic law and foreign-related legal service tools to initiate litigation at home and abroad, effectively blocking the illegal spread of Western human rights hegemony in practical fields through the "hard constraints" of foreign-related rule of law.

2. Optimizing the operation of multilateral mechanisms to enhance capacity for agenda-setting and rule-shaping

In the international public opinion landscape, whoever possesses agenda-setting power has discourse power.[35] To break the structural monopoly of the West on agendas, China needs to formulate and implement agenda strategies characterized by an issue-focused approach and coordinated partnerships, disseminating human rights value concepts formed under China's independent knowledge system of human rights through specific international issues and agendas.

We should continuously cultivate advantageous issues. In platforms such as the UN Human Rights Council, China should continuously advocate, propose, and promote the adoption of resolutions centered on "the right to development," "fairness," and "justice," translating concepts into international rules, and striving to master the initiative of definition and interpretation in the most controversial areas such as the relationship between human rights and sovereignty, and that between individual rights and the right to collective development. The adoption of the resolution on "the contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights" proposed by China at the 59th session of the UN Human Rights Council has demonstrated the potential of reshaping international human rights agendas with the right to development. While upholding that the rights to subsistence and development are primary basic human rights, China should further elucidate to the international community their mutually reinforcing relationship with civil and political rights and other rights, namely creating conditions for the realization of other rights through the rights to subsistence and development, and preventing development goals from overriding rights through the rule of law.

An "agenda alliance" should be established. Rule-shaping in international human rights mechanisms cannot rely on any single country pushing forward alone, but must be grounded in a stable partnership network. China should strengthen cooperation with Global South countries, regional organizations, friendly think tanks, and international social organizations, forming a relatively stable group of sponsors and a network of supporters on common concerns. Through joint research, co-drafting, speaking with one voice, and mutual support, the representativeness and passage rate of relevant issues in international mechanisms can thus be enhanced.

China should enhance its textual capabilities. Competition in international human rights rules is largely manifested as competition in document language, conceptual definitions, and clause structures. China should strengthen continuous tracking and research on UN human rights documents, draft resolutions, special reports, general comments of treaty bodies, and regional human rights documents, thereby deepening its participation in the text formation process. Stable, precise, and acceptable foreign-language expressions should be formed, especially in concepts such as "promoting human rights through development," "win-win cooperation in the field of human rights," "the right to development in the digital age," and "opposition to the politicization of human rights."

The cultivation and recommendation of and support for human rights talents need to be strengthened. A medium- and long-term plan should be established to cultivate versatile talents with expertise in international law, human rights theory, diplomatic negotiations, international organization rules, and cross-cultural communication. Efforts should be made to promote more Chinese experts to enter the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, relevant mechanisms of the Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, and the expert network of special procedures through means such as recommendations, competitive selection, exchanges, and training. Only when more Chinese professional talents serve within international mechanisms can China's

[35] Yang An and Zhang Yantao, "Agenda-Setting and Chinese Discourse Construction," *Theoretical Exploration* 6 (2020): 42.

concepts acquire a more stable institutional presence in document drafting, agenda arrangement, information processing, and policy discussion.

3. Fully utilizing digital-intelligent technology to enhance decision-making, early warning, and international cooperation capabilities

Digital-intelligent technology serves not only as a communication tool, but also as an important support for diplomatic decision-making, early warning of risks, agenda operation, and international cooperation capacity building. China's participation in global human rights governance should deeply embed digital technology into the practical system, forming data-driven, intelligently assisted, rapidly responsive, and synergistically coordinated participation capacity from the following aspects:

A database of international human rights public opinion and an early warning system for risks need to be established. Centered around UN human rights mechanisms, parliamentary and government documents of major Western countries, international NGO reports, mainstream media reports, social platform public opinion, think tank research, and judicial cases, a dynamic database of China-related human rights issues should be established. Through natural language processing, sentiment analysis, issue clustering, and communication path analysis, potential risks and issue diffusion trends can be identified in a timely manner, so as to provide data support for diplomatic responses, legal countermeasures, and communication deployments.

An agenda-tracking platform for multilateral mechanisms should be constructed. Continuous tracking should be conducted on meeting agendas, draft resolutions, speech texts, expert reports, NGO materials, and voting structures of the UN Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, Special Procedures, the Universal Periodic Review, and relevant regional mechanisms, analyzing and assessing the issue combinations, coalition changes, and action strategies of Western countries and relevant organizations to enhance pre-judgment capacity.

Artificial intelligence can be applied to assist diplomatic decision-making. Targeting major human rights issues, policy sandboxes, simulated negotiations, public opinion evolution models, and scheme evaluation tools can be utilized to pre-judge international reactions, communication effects, legal risks, and diplomatic costs of different response strategies. Digital twin and simulation meeting systems can be used for the human rights issue training of diplomats, experts, and social organization representatives to improve their response capacity in international conferences, side-event engagements, media Q&As, and emergencies.

South-South human rights cooperation should be deepened through digital-intelligent cooperation. In the face of the global digital divide, support should be provided to developing countries in digital infrastructure construction, digital public services, smart agriculture, telemedicine, online education, and digital poverty reduction projects through South-South cooperation and the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, thereby enabling digital technology to serve as a tool for promoting the right to development. By sharing digital governance experience, advancing artificial intelligence capacity building, and providing digital public products, China can expand the concept of "promoting human rights through development" into international cooperation practices in the digital-intelligent era, providing realistic support for the Global South to participate in digital human rights governance.

Conclusion

The paradigm transformation of China's participation in global human rights governance in the new era exhibits a distinctive "triple-transition" feature: The first is the transition of the subject role, shifting from a defender passively responding to external pressures to a builder proactively participating in rule-making, and further advancing toward a contributor leading global human rights agenda-setting; the second is the expansion of the diplomatic arena, extending from single bilateral defensive dialogue to regional pragmatic cooperation, and further establishing an international human rights discourse system with Chinese characteristics on the global multilateral stage represented by the United Nations; the third is the sublimation of values and perspectives, upgrading from basic safeguards focusing on the rights to subsistence and development to a comprehensive outlook on human rights encompassing democracy and the rule of law, ecological

civilization, and digital-intelligent rights. This transition sublimates the horizon of human rights from individuals and states to the concern for humanity as a whole, as embodied by the vision of a "community with a shared future for mankind," thereby achieving theoretical transcendence and paradigm reconstruction over Western-centric human rights narratives.

The recently concluded 61st Session of the Human Rights Council can be described as a world-class "human rights battle," which reflects that "human rights are under a full-scale attack around the world... And this assault is...often led by those who hold the greatest power."[36] The politicized utilization of international human rights mechanisms, unilateral sanctions, and discursive smearing by Western countries will not disappear in the short term, nor will structural inequalities in the international communication landscape be altered overnight. China still needs to further enhance its theoretical explanatory power, discursive appeal, rule-shaping capacity, and institutional operational management in its participation in global human rights governance. It is our only choice to actively embrace digital-intelligent transformation, comprehensively upgrade human rights governance, and secure a new high ground in formulating human rights norms in the digital-intelligent era.

China's participation in global human rights governance is a long-term, complex systemic project, and its fundamental basis always lies in the continuous development of the domestic cause of human rights. The persuasive power of international human rights discourse ultimately depends on the actual extent to which people's rights are protected, and the capacity for international rule-shaping ultimately depends on whether domestic institutional practices can provide testable, interpretable, and referable experience. Only by adhering to a people-centered approach, improving the rule-of-law protection of human rights, promoting social fairness and justice, and advancing the all-around development of human beings and common prosperity for all can we continuously strengthen the factual basis, institutional foundation, and moral strength of China's participation in global human rights governance. In the future, China should proceed from the new historical conditions of the digital-intelligent era with a forward-looking perspective, take the *Charter of the United Nations* and international law as normative bases, genuine multilateralism as the basic pathway, the common development needs of the Global South as important concerns, domestic human rights progress as the fundamental support, and advanced technological means as effective tools, expand consensus in equal dialogue, improve rules in mechanism participation, enhance the well-being of peoples of all countries through pragmatic cooperation, and promote and lead global human rights governance toward a direction that is more equitable, just, reasonable, and inclusive, contributing Chinese wisdom, experience, and solutions to the progress of the global cause of human rights and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.

(Translated by *LI Donglin*)

[36] Quoted from the opening speech of UN Secretary-General António Guterres at the 61st Session of the UN Human Rights Council.