

The Institutional Dimension of Global Human Rights Governance

— And on the Institutional Contributions of the Four Global Initiatives

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At a time when global crises continue to intensify, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated at this year's high-level plenary meeting to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations that the core of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, the *Pact for the Future*, and the UN 80 Initiative lies in renewing the foundations of international cooperation. In the current context of global human rights governance, the international community faces governance deficits such as global poverty, regional conflicts, nationalism, unilateralism, and climate change. However, the fundamental challenge remains the “politicization of human rights,” which threatens “cooperation.” This refers to “the tendency and process by which actors in international relations handle human rights issues with a politically pragmatic attitude driven by certain political motives, using human rights as a means to achieve specific political interests.”¹ The risks posed and potentially posed by the politicization of human rights can be analyzed from the perspective of institutional theory. Since 2021, China has successively proposed the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative (collectively referred to as the “Four Global Initiatives”). Faced with the challenge of the politicization of human rights in global human rights governance, these four initiatives, as international public goods for human rights contributed by China, hold significant institutional importance for effectively upholding and fulfilling the purposes and principles of the *Charter of the United Nations* (hereinafter referred to as *UN Charter*).

I. The International Human Rights System from an Institutional Perspective

In an institutional sense, international human rights law constitutes a set of international human rights institutions, with international human rights norms representing a contract arising from the collective actions of subjects in international relations. Compared to general domestic legal systems, the international human rights legal system has weaker punitive measures. This characteristic, to a certain extent, reduces the costs of engaging in politicized human rights behaviors, expands the risks of political polarization in human rights, and increases the difficulty of risk control over the politicization of international human rights.

A. An institutional perspective on global human rights governance

Different institutional paradigms exist in various academic disciplines. In political science, although normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, discourse institutionalism,

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¹ China Society for Human Rights Studies, “The Politicization of Human Rights by the United States Undermines the Foundations of Good Governance in Human Rights,” *People’s Daily*, December 28, 2021.

sociological institutionalism, interest representation institutionalism, and international institutionalism differ in their definitions, preferences, and changes of institutions, they all share a common emphasis on institutions, believing that “institutional factors provide the most appropriate starting point for social analysis.”² In legal studies, Western legal institutionalism flourished at the end of the 20th century, with “old institutionalism primarily represented by Santi Romano, and new institutionalism typically referring to an institutional theory of law represented by Ota Weinberger and Neil MacCormick”³. In economics, there is also a distinction between old institutional economics and new institutional economics. New institutional economics has significantly expanded its research areas by employing methods from neoclassical economics, including adding exogenous constraints such as property rights structures and transaction costs, attempting to explain and internalize market organizations and other contractual structures, and viewing social and political institutions as products of transactions among subjects, where survival competition among institutions can also lead to institutional equilibrium.⁴

To understand institutions from an institutionalist perspective requires transcending specific disciplinary boundaries and revealing the essential characteristics of institutions. “Institutions can be defined as widely known rules that structure recurring interactions. They are equipped with enforcement mechanisms, enabling sanctions or the threat of sanctions in cases of rule violations.”⁵ Stefan Voigt's definition of institutions emphasizes their static rule characteristics and resultant order characteristics, while also revealing their dynamic behavioral interaction characteristics and operational features of sanctioning behaviors and subjects that violate rules. Based on the above understanding, we can divide institutions into four different levels: normative structure, value structure, organizational structure, and enforcement structure. The normative structure of institutions provides actors with behavioral rules to follow, with the core being a rule system. The value structure of institutions is a value consensus formed based on the beliefs and preferences of different actors. The organizational structure of institutions is an organizational system that implements collective actions beyond the will of individual actors within the institutional framework. The enforcement structure of institutions is the enforcement mechanism that maintains institutional operation, focusing on monitoring the behavioral interactions of subjects within the institutional framework, particularly imposing sanctions on actors that violate rules.

All institutions possess certain basic functions. For instance, “Institutions enable people to do things that they cannot do alone; they structure incentives for the pursuit of individual advantage; they influence beliefs and preferences and provide cues for unplanned actions; and they provide order and predictability for human interdependence.”⁶

B. The international human rights system as an institutional framework

From the perspective of institutionalism, the broad “institutional framework” of international human rights (this paper does not delve into regional human rights

² B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism (3rd Edition)*, translated by Wang Xiangmin and Duan Hongwei (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2016), 183.

³ Wang Rongyu, *Institutional Legal Positivism: Neil MacCormick's World of Legal Philosophy* (Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2024), 22.

⁴ Yuan Qingming, *A Course in New Institutional Economics (3rd Edition)* (Beijing: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2021), 18.

⁵ Stefan Voigt, *Institutional Economics*, translated by Shi Shiwei et al. (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2016), 8.

⁶ Allan Schmid, *Conflict and Cooperation: Institutional and Behavioral Economics*, translated by Liu Can and Wu Shuirong (Shanghai: Gezhi Publishing House & Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2018), 1.

institutional systems) is established on the basis of the *UN Charter*, specifically comprising the following four structural systems.

Firstly, there is the normative system built upon the International Bill of Human Rights. This narrowly defined UN human rights institutional system (i.e., a general term for normative arrangements and enforcement mechanisms) is a normative framework centered around the International Bill of Human Rights and specialized human rights conventions. It represents a typical formal institution, that is, codified rules, excluding unwritten codes of conduct. Here, the normative system not only refers to the behavioral rules governing interactions among subjects but also encompasses the allocation of rights and obligations among them, standardizing the dynamic behaviors of subjects through the allocation of rights and obligations (including responsibilities).

Second, there is the value system centered around the *UN Charter* and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. These two documents provide the fundamental basis for consensus and value objectives regarding human rights cooperation among actors in the international community. While the value consensus within this institution does not equate to a consensus on motives among different subjects, it establishes a common direction based on beliefs and preferences for forming normative consensus at the operational level, thereby offering guidance on values and concepts for collective action.

Third, there is the organizational system centered around the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The international organizational system with the UN at its core can be regarded as an organization in the institutionalist sense. International organizations are products of agreements among states, primarily established with the purpose of creating cooperative benefits through international cooperation and collective action. As a coordination system for inter-state action relations, the international organizational system with the UN at its core, particularly the United Nations Human Rights Council and the OHCHR within it, provides decision-making rules and enforcement rules for collective action.

Fourth, there is the enforcement system centered around the supervision of the implementation of international human rights norms, dispute resolution, and rights remedy. The United Nations Human Rights Council reviews compliance reports submitted by State parties through the Universal Periodic Review mechanism, allows for an inter-state complaint mechanism where State parties can accuse one another, and employs mediation, good offices, or arbitration mechanisms by international institutions for human rights disputes among State parties, as well as individual complaint mechanisms. All these fall under the enforcement system within the UN human rights institutional framework.

II. Institutional Risks of the Politicization of Human Rights

The international behaviors of states as members of an organization are subject to the constraints of behavioral rules within the institutional framework. The international human rights normative system establishes the institutional boundaries for the actions of organizational members, namely the UN member states, with institutional constraints primarily manifesting as behavioral constraints on these members. "Polarization is not merely a transient ailment of modern Western societies but a structural pathology resulting from long-term accumulated tensions in their political, economic, social, and cultural orders. Economic polarization has undermined the normative foundations of fairness and equality, political polarization has torn apart the institutional tradition of compromise and negotiation, and social

polarization has further eroded the cultural consensus on pluralistic coexistence.”⁷ From an institutionalist perspective, the politicization of international human rights represents an external spillover effect of domestic political polarization, which fundamentally violates the purposes and principles of the *UN Charter*. This vicious competition not only raises the costs of cooperation but also poses institutional risks that could lead to the breakdown of cooperation.

A. Monopolizing the pricing power of international human rights

The political polarization of international human rights occurs within the context of hegemonic stability, posing risks of monopolizing the pricing power of international human rights. Hegemonic stability implies that human rights are priced by monopolists in the international relations market. Hegemonic states essentially occupy a monopolistic position in the international human rights market, setting the nature, characteristics, composition, and evaluation criteria of human rights as they would for monopolized products. They leverage alliances and other means to exclude competitors or potential competitors from supplying human rights products, ultimately establishing monopolistic prices for human rights. Through rent-seeking and rent-creation mechanisms, hegemonic states maintain and generate economic rents and political gains in international relations. By selectively addressing human rights issues and applying double standards to evaluate human rights situations, they exclude the application of universal and objective standards provided by the international human rights system, demonstrating monopolistic pricing of international human rights. For instance, the so-called Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act passed by the United States incorporates a core concept of “rebuttable presumption,” which presumes that all products manufactured in Xinjiang (China) use “forced labor” and the import of them is prohibited unless certified by U.S. authorities as free from forced labor. This, in essence, constitutes a substantive monopoly on the right to evaluate human rights through domestic legislation and employs legal presumption techniques to shift the burden of proof onto corresponding importers.

B. Deteriorating the existing international human rights order

The political polarization of international human rights violates the Pareto improvement principle for the efficiency of human rights realization, posing risks of deteriorating the existing international human rights order. “An allocation is a Pareto improvement over another allocation if, and only if, it makes at least one person better off without making anyone worse off.”⁸ From the perspective of Pareto efficiency, the political polarization of international human rights causes price distortions in human rights. For example, the Paris Agreement explicitly requires developed countries to continue proposing economy-wide absolute emissions reduction targets, while encouraging developing countries to gradually move towards economy-wide absolute emissions reduction or limitation targets based on their national circumstances. This provision is rooted in institutional economics: if developing countries were to assume the same emissions reduction obligations as developed countries, it would significantly increase the costs of environmental rights protection for developing countries and severely constrain the space for their people to improve the enjoyment of other human rights, thereby distorting the price of environmental rights. Additionally, the Paris Agreement explicitly mandates developed countries to continue providing financial support for developing countries, which essentially

⁷ Pang Jinyou and Shen Fuyuan, “Polarization Undermines Norms: The Theoretical and Practical Conflicts in Western Modern Political Order,” *Study Exploration* 8 (2025): 35.

⁸ Lee S. Friedman, *Microeconomics of Public Policy Analysis*, translated by Zhang Wei et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2019), 48.

serves as compensation: the emission reductions in developing countries also benefit developed countries, justifying corresponding compensation.

C. Disrupting the functioning of international human rights organizations

The political polarization of international human rights undermines the “third-party” resolution approach, posing risks of organizational dysfunction or even disintegration. Since 1945, the U.S. has withdrawn from UN bodies over a dozen times. In 2018 and 2025, during Donald Trump’s presidencies, the U.S. government has withdrawn from the United Nations Human Rights Council twice and demanded a review of the stances of institutions such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) toward the U.S., with its rhetoric clearly tinged with political overtones. “The U.S. accusations are more of a rhetorical coercion, using ‘politicization’ to express dissatisfaction with opposing views within the organization and protest against the decline in its ability to control the organization.”⁹ However, addressing differences and divergences on human rights issues through confrontation rather than dialogue and unilateral coercion rather than multilateral cooperation not only increases negotiation costs among countries but also sidelines the dispute resolution function of the UN, undermining the “third-party” resolution approach and risking leaving the UN as a hollow entity or even causing its dysfunction. “In extreme cases, the defection of a major actor, such as the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, could paralyze a system.”¹⁰

D. Subverting the equilibrium of international human rights game

The behavioral game backed by national strength in the context of political polarization of international human rights disrupts the institutional game, posing risks of subverting the equilibrium of the international human rights institutional game. The international human rights order based on the international human rights law represents the equilibrium solution of the institutional game. On the one hand, the international legal norms generated by the UN system are the result of multiple rounds of game interactions among countries in the international community since World War II, reflecting institutional equilibrium. On the other hand, the international human rights law delineates the feasible scope and space for countries’ international human rights behaviors, embodying institutional constraints. The realist attitude of individual major powers toward international human rights mechanisms has triggered an identity crisis for these mechanisms.¹¹ Based on its dollar hegemony, an individual major power froze USD7 billion in foreign exchange assets of a certain country’s central bank, disrupting the institutional game of the international human rights order through a one-time (rather than repeated) behavioral game. This behavioral game does not follow the institutional rules under the established system but violates the existing institutional constraints, thus only serving as a behavioral game that undermines the international human rights order.

III. Institutional Contributions of the Four Major Global Initiatives

The institutional environment can also be viewed as the institutional framework and external constraints for the operation of institutions, which significantly influences their operational efficiency. The institutional framework comprises political, property rights, and social structures, with the political structure being the

⁹ Chen Xiuwen, “The Politicization of International Organizations: Taking the U.S. Withdrawal from UNESCO Twice as an Example,” (M.A. diss., Nanjing University, 2020), 57.

¹⁰ B. Guy Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism (3rd Edition)*, 176.

¹¹ Mao Junxiang, “The Practical Dilemmas, Ideological Divisions, and China’s Solutions in Global Human Rights Governance,” *Chinese Journal of Human Rights* 1 (2023): 82.

most crucial, as it “defines how people establish and aggregate political choices.”¹² Political polarization directly impacts the institutional environment for the functioning of international human rights at the political structural level. The emergence of the four major global initiatives has played a role in repairing the damaged institutional framework of international human rights, facilitating the creation of an institutional environment oriented towards economic development, political democracy, value pluralism, and good governance.

A. Expanding the institutional supply of international human rights goods

From a consumption perspective, the international human rights system exhibits characteristics of public goods, namely non-rivalry and non-excludability in use. However, from a production perspective, it faces challenges in public goods provision. “A public good is a product consumed by a large number of individuals, so the benefit each person derives from it does not depend on how much they individually purchase or provide, but rather on how much everyone purchases or provides.”¹³ The asymmetry between production and consumption, where one party supplies and multiple parties benefit, poses a challenge to public goods provision, which is particularly pronounced in the field of international human rights. The economic imbalance and widening gap between the North and South, coupled with political inequality among countries, have resulted in weakened voice for developing countries in the global human rights governance landscape and insufficient capacity to supply international human rights public goods. On the other hand, developed countries with the capacity for institutional supply have low willingness to do so, even failing to fulfill their international obligations in traditional areas such as international poverty and climate change, and lacking effective human rights institutional outputs in emerging areas like artificial intelligence and cyberspace.

The four major global initiatives are public goods contributed by China to the international community amid an increasingly uncertain international environment. First, they supply human rights public goods with economies of scale. The four international issues of security, development, civilization, and governance are closely linked to everyone’s rights to subsistence and development, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. They cover the majority of specific rights areas in content and a wide range of human activities in practical effect, generating economies of scale. Second, they provide optimized institutional alternatives. In an institutional framework that allows and encourages healthy competition, institutional changes often result in the emergence of institutions that can achieve their objectives and significantly reduce transaction costs, leading to institutional alternatives. For instance, China’s decades-long poverty alleviation efforts have enabled it to achieve the goals of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ahead of schedule, providing a practical model for global human rights governance and validating through actions and results that development serves as the foundation for eradicating poverty and realizing human rights. The resolution on “the contribution of development to the enjoyment of all human rights,” proposed by China and adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council in July 2025, demonstrates the competitive advantage and potential substitution of "promoting human rights through development" as an institution. Finally, they have formed a

¹² Lu Xianxiang and Zhu Qiaoling, *New Institutional Economics (3rd Edition)* (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2021), 98.

¹³ Robert Sugden, *The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare*, translated by Fang Qin (Shanghai: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2008), 6.

systematic new institutional framework for global human rights governance. The four major global initiatives have established a full-process and multi-dimensional institutional system, addressing the institutional environment, driving forces, implementation means, and safeguards for global human rights governance, and “safeguarding human rights through security, promoting them through development, advancing them through cooperation, and driving continuous improvement in global human rights governance and progress in the global human rights cause through action-oriented and pragmatic cooperation.”¹⁴

B. Stabilizing the institutional expectations of international human rights order

Stability is a fundamental characteristic of institutions, and addressing uncertainty constitutes their basic function. An effectively functioning institution can foster a relatively stable order, which, in turn, enables the entities within the institutional framework to develop basic institutional expectations. “Institutions not only serve as normative guides for behavior in specific domains but also shape individuals’ choices and their perceptions of the framework within which they operate.”¹⁵ In an institutional context, the trust that behavioral subjects place in one another is both reinforced and safeguarded by the institution itself, primarily because the actions of one subject can be anticipated by others.

The four major global initiatives reaffirm and elevate the shared value consensus formed in response to the common challenges facing humanity today, thus enhancing the multi-layered institutionalization of global human rights governance. “The institutionalized concept based on escalating returns emphasizes the role of material incentives; the one based on escalating commitments underscores the role of identity; while the concept with increasing objectification highlights the role of ideas and ideologies.”¹⁶ The four global initiatives clearly define their core philosophies, fundamental principles, and shared objectives, while also outlining directions or practical plans for action: the Global Development Initiative aims to “jointly advance global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth,” focusing on promoting cooperation in nine key areas, including poverty reduction; the Global Security Initiative seeks to “encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era,” emphasizing single or multiple collaborations in over twenty aspects, such as advocating for the UN to formulate recommendations for A New Agenda for Peace; the Global Civilization Initiative aims to “promote inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations,” jointly advocating for concepts such as the common values of humanity and promoting robust international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation; the Global Governance Initiative seeks to “promote the building of a more just and equitable global governance system,” prioritizing six areas where governance is in urgent need and scant supply, such as the reform of the international financial architecture. Collectively, the four global initiatives converge into institutional consensus from the perspective of a community with a shared future for mankind, focusing on facilitating international cooperation for development, resolving international disputes through dialogue and consultation, promoting exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations, and reforming the global governance

¹⁴ Jiang Jianguo, “The Contemporary Significance of the Victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression for Human Rights,” *Guangming Daily*, September 20, 2025.

¹⁵ Mark Granovetter, *Society and Economy: Framework and Principles*, translated by Wang Shuixiong and Luo Jiade (Beijing: CITIC Press Group, 2019), 223.

¹⁶ W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities (4th Edition)*, translated by Yao Wei et al. (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2020), 153.

mechanisms. They facilitate the institutionalization of multiple mechanisms that mutually influence and reinforce one another, thereby effectively stabilizing and enhancing the institutional expectations of the international community regarding the international human rights order and the effectiveness of global human rights governance.

C. Safeguarding the institutional functions of international human rights organizations

The UN serves as the core platform for practicing multilateralism and advancing global governance, playing a pivotal role in the operation of the international human rights system. It represents the highest achievement of self-organized activities in human history. The UN-centered international system and the international order based on international law fundamentally reduce uncertainties in inter-state interactions, lower costs associated with search and negotiation among nations through organizational forms, and minimize supervision and enforcement costs through rule-based mechanisms. However, the functioning of the UN itself and the exercise of its institutional functions entail costs. It is a fundamental obligation for all member states to uphold the organizational framework and ensure the smooth operation of the UN.

In terms of organizational structure, the four global initiatives advocate for leveraging the central role of the UN organizational system. First, it is imperative to safeguard the authority of the UN system, such as designating the UN as the primary platform for global security governance and supporting the World Health Organization (WHO) in assuming a leadership role in global public health governance. Second, it is crucial to ensure the normal operation of the UN system. For instance, the payment of UN dues represents a form of cost-sharing for public goods. “Each individual must adjust their behavior according to a unified payment scheme; although taxes are paid in perfectly divisible units, the fact that tax schemes are selected and implemented through political processes ensures their public nature.”¹⁷ Third, it is essential to strengthen the complementary roles of other organizational mechanisms in global human rights governance, such as leveraging the mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS partnership, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and East Asia regional cooperation to facilitate security cooperation.

D. Promoting the institutional equilibrium in international human rights game

From an institutional standpoint, the process of interaction and exchange among actors is an interactive behavioral gameplay unfolding within an institutional framework. “How do institutions structure social interaction? A brief answer is that they establish rules to guide strategic decision-making by social actors who abide by them.”¹⁸ Given that each actor’s specific strategic decision-making is predicated on information about the behaviors (or strategies) of others, frequent violations of institutional norms, particularly recurrent and explicit politicization of human rights, will impact the institutional expectations of all other actors within the institutional framework, thereby severely undermining the foundation of mutual trust and positive interactive behaviors among rule-abiding actors.

The four global initiatives oppose a zero-sum game and advocate for a cooperative game based on institutional equilibrium. “Institutional equilibrium exists

¹⁷ James M. Buchanan, *The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (2nd Edition)*, translated by Ma Jun (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2017), 119.

¹⁸ Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict (2nd Edition)*, translated by Zhou Weilin (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2017), 56.

when, given the distribution of bargaining power and the set of contractual negotiations that constitute the entire economic exchange, no party can improve its position by investing resources to restructure the contract.”¹⁹ Cooperation stands as the central theme of the four global initiatives. The Global Security Initiative resists and opposes Cold War mentality, unilateralism, bloc confrontation, and hegemonism; the Global Development Initiative remains committed to promoting synergistic progress in multilateral cooperation for development; the Global Civilization Initiative advocates for the “joint” advancement of human civilization through enhanced international cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation; and the Global Governance Initiative upholds a global governance principle of extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefit.

The cooperative nature of the four global initiatives implies repeated gameplay among multiple actors. Multi-actor gameplay represents a complex form of interaction, necessitating institutionalization for effective conduct, with a demand for institutions and the necessity to maintain institutional platforms. Repeated gameplay indicates that interactions are not one-time events, which significantly restrains behavioral uncertainty and reduces the tendency of gameplay actors to pursue short-term maximization strategies. Meanwhile, repeated gameplay suggests a predominantly cooperative nature, where, although competition inevitably exists, healthy competition inherently opposes zero-sum game and seeks to generate cooperative gains through competitive cooperation.

Conclusion

From the perspective of New Institutional Economics, the core function of institutions is to reduce transaction costs. Ronald Coase’s papers “The Problem of Social Cost” and “The Nature of the Firm” are foundational works in the theory of New Institutional Economics. “One of the most critical insights for reshaping economic theory is that if transactions are costly, then institutions matter.”²⁰ Given that interactions among individuals in the real world inevitably incur transaction costs, from an economic standpoint, institutions designed to promote cooperation and reduce these costs are undoubtedly crucial. All human activities entail positive transaction costs, and the emergence of organizations serves precisely to economize on these costs. Consequently, breaches of institutional boundaries established by organizations — that is, institutional violations — can fundamentally elevate transaction costs, posing risks of institutional disruption or even collapse.

The international human rights system is both a product of cooperation among states and an integral component driving sustained collaboration between states and international organizations to shape a sound international human rights order and jointly build a community with a shared future for mankind. From an institutional perspective, the four global initiatives have elicited strong resonance, rapid responses, and widespread acceptance in the international community not just because the concepts and principles they advocate resonate with the shared aspirations of the international community and the actions they propose effectively consolidate the direction and pathways for international cooperation. More importantly, amid the heightened uncertainty risks facing the international community, such international public goods can effectively reduce the transaction costs associated with conducting international human rights activities. They open up new institutional spaces for

¹⁹ Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, translated by Hang Xing (Shanghai: Gezhi Publishing House, Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, and Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2014), 102.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

countries worldwide to engage in sustained cooperation, take collective action, and achieve win-win outcomes in the field of international human rights, potentially heralding a revolution in the global human rights governance paradigm.

(Translated by *LI Chunyan*)