On the Relative Universality of Human Rights

LIU Han*

Abstract: The dialectical relationship between the universality and particularity of human rights is a core issue in human rights theory and practice. This paper intends to conduct an analysis from three dimensions — basic concepts, values, and legal implementation — and clarify the relative universality of human rights by drawing on the distinction between “rules and principles” in jurisprudence and the logic of interpretation and application of rights provisions. At the conceptual level, human rights embody the proposition of universality, yet they exhibit relativity in both temporal and spatial dimensions. At the ideological level, political perspectives on human rights and cultural relativism (including meta-ethical relativism) remind us that human rights also possess the attribute of local knowledge. At the legal level, human rights norms mostly exist in the form of principles rather than rules; their high degree of abstraction leads to diversified interpretations, and the implementation mechanisms across different countries also demonstrate diversity. Recognizing and grasping the relative universality of human rights is conducive to a deeper understanding of the tension between universal principles and specific contexts, and also helps to avoid the biases and limitations that may arise from adhering to a single “universalism” or “particularism” discourse in practice.

Keywords: human rights · universality · particularity · cultural relativism · legal implementation