Digital Human Rights from the Perspective of System Theory
— Concept Definition, Social Function, and Constitutional Basis

WENG Zhuangzhuang

Abstract: The three core issues in the “digital human rights” debate are whether “digital human rights” are possible, necessary, and feasible. Both sides of the debate focus on discovering the value of “digital human rights” to individuals from a semantic level, but ignore the significance of “digital human rights” to the whole society and its subsystems at the level of social structure. By introducing Luhmann’s System Theory, this observation blind spot can be eliminated. Fundamental rights are devoted to directly shaping not a physiological-psychological “individual” as a social environment but a social “person” that can be included by social systems. It is clear that digital human rights are the right to participate in digital communication of a “human” as a “person”, so they are possible in terms of conceptual definition. Digital human rights can help “people” lower the threshold for participation in digital communication, limit the excessive expansion of social systems, and promote the free and complete expression of body and mind, so they are necessary for social functions. There are limitations in the existing two ideas of “incorporating digital human rights into the constitution”. Based on the new construction idea of System Theory of Law, digital human rights as the right to participate in digital communication can be typified into digital communication in social sub-fields such as politics, economy, science, and art. The right to participate constructs a complete digital human rights system, making it feasible on the basis of the constitution.

Keywords: system theory · human · digital human rights · social communication · digital communication