Abstract: Human rights protection models in the digital era can be divided into three conceptual types, namely: coordinated, synthetic and composite human rights protection models. The coordinated human rights protection model aims to reconcile the practical and normative significance of "digitalization of human rights", to strengthen the protection of human rights by digital technology with the times, and to avoid and regulate the exploitation of human rights by digital technology. The synthetic model of human rights protection has generated some controversy. Under this model, it is necessary not only to strengthen human rights protection for digital technology and respect human dignity, but also to remain vigilant against "digital human rights", and avoid the digital human rights of human rights to avoid the intrinsic connotation of human rights. The composite human rights protection model, which views human rights as a common language and opposes the threat to human rights posed by digitization, requires "cross-border" cooperation to jointly protect human dignity and human rights. Among these three human rights protection models, compared with the synthetic human rights protection model, which is prone to generalization of human rights and unfocused protection, the coordinated and composite human rights protection models have a consistent and coherent nature, and are more suitable as alternatives for the transformation of human rights protection in the digital era. Regardless of the human rights protection model, it needs to be based on a solid theoretical foundation, i.e., human rights as the cornerstone and human nature as the foundation, in order to better protect human rights in the digital era.
 
Keywords: digital era, human rights digitalization digital human rights human rights protection model
 
In the digital age, the application of new science and technology has had a great impact on traditional human rights theories and human rights protection models. As a result, a variety of different doctrinal views and practical paths have arisen. From the viewpoint of scholars' research and relevant documents of the United Nations, the human rights protection model in the digital era can be divided into three types of concepts: coordinated, synthesized and composite.
 
I. Digitalization of Human Rights - Coordinated Human Rights Protection Model

The coordinated human rights protection model in the digital era takes "human rights digitalization" as the main connotation. The so-called "digitalization of human rights" contains both factual and normative connotations. In terms of factual meaning, "digitalization of human rights" describes the erosion of human rights, dignity, freedom and other values in the digital era. In terms of normative meaning, "digitalization of human rights" also expresses the boundaries of the exercise of scientific and technological power, and that digital technologies such as information technology, big data, and artificial intelligence must be used and developed under the premise of adhering to the value orientation of human rights as the core. There exists a tension between reality and ideal, actuality and contingency between the factual connotation and normative meaning of "digitalization of human rights", which needs to be tried, reflected, deconstructed and reconstructed in the process of repeated scientific research and practical testing, so as to systematically solve the problem of human rights protection in the digital era through multiple perspectives of observation and adaptation of diversified methods. Problems For example, based on the functional differentiation of ethical, political, economic, legal and cultural social systems, a self-organized and co-evolving normative framework of "digitalization of human rights" is constructed in the complex social structure.

The coordinated human rights protection model emphasizes the use of existing human rights normative consensus to adapt to the development of the times and the needs of human rights protection. For example, while the digital transformation of the supply chain poses challenges to human rights due diligence, technological enablement may also be utilized to identify and prevent human rights risks. Some scholars have pointed out that "despite the unpredictability of business relationships in digital supply chains, the difficulty of identifying responsible parties and the technical obstacles to evidence collection. However, international human rights law, centered on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, still provides an authoritative and pragmatic cornerstone." (Yingman Tang, Academic Forum, No. 2, 2023.) Therefore, coordinated human rights protection can be adapted based on existing experiences and methods, and a "human rights digitalization" protection program can be constructed on the basis of international human rights obligations, corporate human rights responsibilities, and multidimensional governance measures. Specifically, the first step is to clarify the State's obligation to protect human rights, and to introduce the institutional design of human rights assessment, human rights monitoring and human rights reform within the legal normative system related to "digitization". Secondly, digital platforms, enterprises and the industry as a whole should formulate human rights due diligence programs adapted to the process of digital transformation, so as to realize "soft law governance" through industry self-regulation in conjunction with human rights policies, and to avoid human rights from being structurally suppressed or infringed upon by the social power of society under the auspices of science and technology. Secondly, the coordinated approach to human rights protection also addresses the difficulties of remedies caused by the network structure of technological discourse, such as the hidden nature of infringement, mechanisms, and comprehensiveness.

The generation of social public power by digital technology has led to a change in the structure of traditional human rights theory, from a binary structure to a triadic structure in the digital age, with the transformation of "human rights - state obligations" to "human rights - state public power obligations - human rights - human rights" and "human rights - state public power obligations - human rights - human rights". The normative structure of "human rights - state obligations" has been transformed into "human rights - state public power obligations - social public power obligations". Big data platforms and other subjects of social power also play positive and negative roles in the mode of human rights protection. Against this background, the coordinated human rights protection model aims to reconcile the practical and normative significance of the "digitization of human rights", to strengthen the protection of human rights by digital technology in keeping with the times, and to avoid and regulate the exploitation of human rights by digital technology.
 
II. Digital human rights - a synthetic model of human rights protection

Unlike the coordinated model, the digital era has also given rise to a synthetic human rights protection model represented by the doctrine of "digital human rights". The synthetic human rights protection model advocates "digital + human rights", synthesizing a new type of human rights. However, there are some problems with the theoretical validation of this new type of human rights.
First, what is the theoretical basis of "digital human rights"? At present, there are two ways of saying, one is that "digital human rights" is based on "digital humanity". As we all know, traditional human rights theory is based on the natural and social attributes of human beings. What are the attributes of "digital humanity"? Does it belong to human nature? Some Chinese scholars believe that digital attributes are an extension of the social nature of human beings. (Gong Xianghe, 2023.) A question arises here: what is the significance of the so-called "digital humanity" to the traditional natural and social nature? From the perspective of the digital divide, information barriers, and privacy invasion, "digital humanity" is a tampering with human nature, which will easily lead to the loss of critical, reflective, and normative human rights, and deviate from human dignity. Another argument is that "digital human rights" consists of the digitization of traditional human rights and the digital emergence of human rights. This argument incorporates, to some extent, the idea of "digitization of human rights" and a coordinated model of protection, while at the same time emphasizing the idea that emerging rights rise to the level of fundamental human rights. The question is whether emerging digital rights can be recognized as human rights in terms of their jurisprudential foundations, constitutional norms and other dimensions. It should be noted that digital rights and human rights should not be confused, digital rights if they do not meet the minimum basic standard of proof, it is difficult to prove that the Constitution does not enumerate the rights, forced into the human rights system there is a risk of human rights generalization, human rights system confusion. This kind of generalization includes both the generalization of human rights subjects, such as artificial intelligence as the same as human beings; also includes the generalization of human rights subjects, i.e., various kinds of rights that do not have the basic human rights equivalence are mixed into human rights. In other words, if changes in the external technological environment are taken as the criterion for the internal validation of human rights, then human rights can be superimposed indefinitely, and strange concepts such as the human rights of aviation and the human rights of transportation will be created. In this way, the concept of human rights is too complicated, but not conducive to the focus of the institutionalized protection system.

Secondly, assuming that digital rights are a kind of human rights, how should this kind of human rights be positioned? What is its relationship with traditional political and civil rights, economic, social and cultural rights, or other three generations of human rights? Some scholars have put forward the theoretical proposition that "digital human rights are the fourth generation of human rights". (Ma Changshan) The key to the validity of this proposition lies in how "digital human rights" can be recognized on the basis of the humanity of traditional human rights, which is different from traditional human rights. Unfortunately, digital citizenship, digital democracy, digital equity, anti-algorithmic discrimination, anti-digital divide, etc. advocated by "digital human rights" can be completely categorized into the first three generations of human rights systems. Instead of saying that "digital human rights are the fourth generation of human rights", it is more important to say that how to ensure the right to freedom, social rights and collective human rights in the digital era is the major issue.

Third, on the premise that digital human rights have not yet formed an academic or constitutional consensus, some scholars have begun to try to construct a "normative system of digital human rights". (Gao Yifei, 2023) Obviously, this attempt is not premised on a basic consensus, nor has it broken away from the paradigm of traditional human rights or rule of law theories, such as negative human rights, positive human rights, legal rules, legal principles, public interest, and the principle of proportionality. It can even be said that this "digital +" mode of human rights knowledge production has not produced any real innovation, and thus it is difficult to lead the practice of human rights protection in the era. Moreover, the reconstruction of the normative system needs to be problem-oriented and targeted at the inadequacies of the existing system. Otherwise, the traditional experience of human rights protection may be lost in the process of digital transformation, which means that human dignity, freedom and even human integrity may be slaughtered or damaged by science and technology.

Summarizing the above three points, the concept of "digital human rights" proposed by academics in the digital era is a synthetic model of protection, which has also generated some controversy. This concept or theory holds that digital science and technology has replaced traditional human rights and has developed into the fourth generation of human rights, and that "digital humanity" should be used to justify "digital human rights". However, some scholars believe that "digital human rights" leads to the generalization and alienation of human rights subjects and human rights subjects. "Digital human nature" is not human nature, and it cannot change the gene of human rights, and thus cannot generate human rights. Therefore, under the human rights protection model of digital human rights, it is necessary not only to strengthen human rights protection for digital science and technology, respecting human dignity, but also to remain vigilant against "digital human rights", avoiding digital human rights from emptying the inherent connotation of human rights.
 
iii. the united nations digital compact - a composite human rights protection model

In May 2023, the United Nations released the Our Common Agenda policy brief: "The Global Digital Compact - Creating an Open, Free and Secure Digital Future for All". Noting that the world is witnessing a digital divide that continues to widen, the United Nations recognized the urgent need for humanity to work together to find ways to leverage digital technologies for the benefit of all and to avoid increasing inequality. As a result, UN Secretary-General António Guterres has proposed a Global Digital Compact to advance an open, free, secure and people-centered digital future that is grounded in universal human rights and makes it possible to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In the Roadmap for Digital Cooperation issued by the United Nations Secretary-General, the idea of making human rights equally applicable online and offline was also proposed. The core idea is to protect and promote human rights, human dignity and human rights autonomy in an era of digital interdependence; and to place human rights at the center of regulatory frameworks and legislation for the development and use of digital technologies. To this end, the United Nations has set out a number of action areas, including "global connectivity", "digital public goods", "digital inclusion", "digital capacity-building" and "artificial intelligence". Artificial Intelligence", "Digital Trust and Security", "Global Digital Cooperation", and so on. The main points of the report include: first, stating that the normative framework of digital technology should be centered on human rights; second, emphasizing the application and guidance of human rights standards in the digital era; third, filling the loopholes in human rights protection caused by the development of digital technology and curbing acts of cyber-surveillance and interception of information; fourth, perfecting the mechanism of privacy protection in each country and the measures taken by enterprises to respect privacy; and fifth, safeguarding the freedom of expression and protecting the "vulnerable groups" in the digital era. Fifth, it is to safeguard freedom of expression and protect the security of "vulnerable groups" in the digital space; and lastly, it is to construct United Nations system-wide guidelines on human rights due diligence and impact assessment for the use of new technologies.

The Global Digital Compact and the Digital Cooperation Initiative can be characterized as a "composite" model of human rights protection. This model of human rights guarantees recognizes human rights as, first, a common language, a language of opposition to injustice, oppression, greed and abuse of power, and a language of protection and security for everyone. Secondly, the "composite" model of human rights guarantees sees the threats to human security posed by digitization, the misuse of digital infrastructure that contributes to human rights abuses, including the unknowing collection and use of privacy and personal data, the use of technology and software by States or platforms for surveillance, and the potential for discrimination against vulnerable people, such as women and persons with disabilities. Repeatedly, the process of developing technology standards needs to incorporate human rights values. For example, the Artificial Intelligence Bill being developed by the EU seeks to establish common normative standards for high-risk AI systems, which should be consistent with the human rights principles of texts or agreements such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Again, human rights protection in the digital age requires "cross-border" cooperation in order to realize the ambition of human rights protection. Whether it is fair participation or human rights protection in developing countries, it requires the multifaceted cooperation and joint promotion of the political, legal and economic systems, so as to provide comprehensive and three-dimensional protection of human dignity in the process of systematic governance.
 
IV. Conclusion: Reflections on Human Rights Protection Models in the Digital Age

Compared with the synthetic human rights protection model, which is prone to generalization of human rights and unfocused protection, the coordinated and composite human rights protection models have the same coherence and are more suitable as alternatives for the transformation of human rights protection in the digital era. After briefly describing the three modes of human rights protection in the digital era, there are a few more reflections to be shared.

First, the protection of human rights in the digital era needs to be based on a solid theoretical foundation, i.e., human rights as the cornerstone and human nature as the foundation. The "digital + human rights" synthetic protection model has the problems of human rights subject and human rights generalization of the subject, both of which are the symptoms of human rights alienation and the chaos of the digital era. The generalization of the human rights subject is to regard the body that does not belong to the human rights subject as the human rights subject, and the subjectivization of information identity and artificial intelligence has diluted the universality and uniqueness of human beings as the human rights subject. The generalization of human rights as subjects is the addition of digital standards to rights that belong to human rights, and the elevation of rights that do not belong to human rights to human rights, and the humanization of digital rights may lead to the dumping of basic human rights, which are the most important for the maintenance of subjectivity. The generalization of human rights all belongs to the challenge to human subjectivity, which is both futuristic, fundamental and direct, and realistic, instrumental and indirect. The reason for this is that the falsification of human nature by "digital humanity" leads to the fabrication of human rights by "digital human rights". This usurpation of the internal validation of human rights by external perspectives and external arguments needs to be corrected. Diverse external perspectives and diverse research methods are conducive to understanding the complexity of social relations involving human rights in the field of human rights research, but descriptive research cannot directly derive human rights norms, nor can it substantiate specific human rights. In terms of the core elements of human rights, if a right or a collection of rights is to be certified as a human right, it needs to be certified in terms of its core elements of morality, universality, politics and vulnerability before it can be called a human right. In terms of the dual aspect of the function of human rights, the internal linkages between human rights and digital technology, digital society, digital government and digital existence in "digital human rights" need to be understood within a human rights law construct that is both defensive and cooperative. In short, human rights and their protection programs in the digital era should be justified by returning to the internal mechanism and logic of human rights. Otherwise, the proliferation of human rights arguments by "digital human rights" will lead to serious confusion about the subject and scope of human rights, as well as the meaning of the concept of human rights itself. Therefore, in terms of the basic principles of human rights, the protection of human rights in the digital age requires clarification of the meaning and concept of human rights stability. Then, within the human rights protection system in the digital era, based on human nature and dignity, the relevance of human rights and the changes of the times should be coordinated and adapted to the changes of the social environment; at the same time, the human rights protection system in the digital era should be constructed in a systematic and composite manner, so as to minimize the risks and crises of the large-scale digital technological changes on the human rights cause of the whole human beings.

Secondly, the protection of human rights in the digital age does not need to revolutionize the intergenerational division of human rights. Extracting the principle of the intergenerational division of human rights from the historical dimension of the "three generations of human rights", it can be found that the essence of the intergenerational innovation of human rights is the structural expansion of the existing human rights system by the newborn human rights. However, the subject of human rights, the subject of obligations, and the relationship of rights and obligations between them in "digital human rights" can all be reasonably explained within the framework of the existing human rights system. The emergence of "digital human rights" does not constitute an intergenerational innovation of human rights, and does not break through the established three-generation paradigm of human rights construction. From the point of view of the principle of generational division, it is a quantitative expansion of human rights. Therefore, "digital human rights" does not constitute an intergenerational innovation of human rights, and does not break through the established three-generation human rights pattern, and is more reasonably categorized as the first or second generation of human rights. Therefore, "digital human rights" is not a new type of human rights upgrading the fourth generation of human rights. On the other hand, the "three generations of human rights" theory itself is also a relatively rough type of division, which is difficult to cover the development of human rights theory and practice under different historical and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, instead of theoretically constructing a new generation of human rights, we should rather search for the moral basis of human rights in basic theory, and then promote the transformation of human rights from moral form to institutional and actual form. There is no need to construct the so-called "digital form" of human rights. Similarly, at the constitutional level, it is better to package privacy, personal information rights and interests, digital equity and other legal interests as "digital human rights" not listed in the Constitution, rather than interpreting and protecting them based on the original division of fundamental rights in the Constitution, which is more conducive to the effective constitutional protection of human rights in the digital era. Thirdly, the protection of human rights in the digital age requires the defense of human rights field law. Human rights law takes human rights as a benchmark, constructs a closed system of rights, and delimits the boundaries of human rights law. In the three-dimensional structure of "human rights - fundamental rights - legal rights", human rights are the most universal rights; fundamental rights are the fundamental rights granted to the citizens of the country within the scope of constitutional guarantees; legal rights are the general or specific rights guaranteed by the laws enacted in accordance with the Constitution. or specific rights. The three are both different and related. Specifically, human rights are the most important legal source of constitutional rights and legal rights; constitutional rights are the normative basis of legal rights; and constitutional rights and legal rights recognize and protect human rights at different levels of the legal system. The theoretical and practical significance of distinguishing between the three concepts of rights lies in clarifying the scope of the subject of rights, their priority and the intensity of their protection. Therefore, their theoretical boundaries should not be easily broken in order to prevent disturbing the internal structure of the human rights normative system, which will cause trouble in the doctrine and practice.

Author: Liu Zhiqiang, Professor, Institute of Human Rights, Guangzhou University, China.