Abstract: From the perspective of the principle of intergenerational division, “digital human rights” are an increase in the number of human rights, which can be reasonably explained within the framework of the existing human rights system. They do not break through the existing three-generation pattern of human rights, so they do not constitute an intergenerational innovation of human rights. From the perspective of the moral attribute of human rights, “digital human rights” do not have the moral basis of human rights, lack “human nature” as the core of value and moral basis, are incapable of achieving the justification of moral human rights, and thus cannot become fundamental human rights. From the perspective of fundamental rights, “digital human rights” neither have the normative basis of the Constitution, nor be justified as unenumerated fundamental rights in the Constitution due to failing to meet the “human dignity” standards and “minimum & fundamental” standards. Therefore, “digital human rights” are neither the fourth generation of human rights, a new type of human rights upgrading, nor human rights.

 

Keywords: “digital human rights”; the fourth feneration of human rights; human rights

 

 

*Liu Zhiqiang, distinguished professor of the Guangzhou Scholars Program of Guangzhou University, professor and doctoral supervisor of the Guangzhou University Institute for Human Rights.